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The U.S. corporate tax system is failing to keep pace with the 
evolving global economic landscape.  The overwhelmingly complex 
regime rewards aggressive tax planning and creates incentives for 
corporations to move capital offshore.  Calls for fundamental reform are 
escalating as the current system succumbs to the pressures of declining 
revenues, ever-emerging loopholes, and the perpetuation of one of the 
highest national statutory rates in the world.1  Indeed, President Obama 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.  Many thanks to David 
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University of Florida, and University of Colorado-Boulder Law Schools, all of which provided 
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 1. See Impact of International Tax Reform on U.S. Competitiveness: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Ways and Means Comm., 109th Cong. 109-82 
(2006) [hereinafter International Tax Competitiveness Hearing]; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS (Nov. 2005) [hereinafter CBO 
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has acknowledged these shortcomings and repeatedly affirmed his 
commitment to significantly overhaul the corporate tax system.2  While 
academics, practitioners, and the White House have proposed any 
number of reform measures to deal with the problems plaguing the U.S. 
corporate tax regime, their solutions involve varying structural and 
statutory changes, which are in fact extrinsic to the form of the 
underlying rules themselves.3  In contrast, this Article argues for an 
innate form of change to the U.S. corporate tax rules, which would 
fundamentally affect the way in which tax lawmakers actually draft tax 
rules and regulations.  In particular, it argues that a systemic focus and 
commitment by lawmakers to a more principles-based approach to 
regulation would significantly mitigate many of the challenges currently 
encumbering the U.S. tax regime.  Unlike the present system, which 
relies almost exclusively on a complex entanglement of bright-line 
prescriptive rules, a principles-focused corporate tax regime would help 
significantly simplify tax provisions, close loopholes, make the system 
more responsive to a dynamic marketplace, and serve as a gateway to 
lowering the U.S. corporate tax rate.  Thus, the implementation of more 
principles-based rules should be given consideration in any 
contemplated tax reform proposals. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As significant limitations that previously stifled investment in many 
foreign markets have eroded, corporations are now able cost-effectively 
to invest capital and resources virtually anywhere in the globe.  It is 
estimated that in the past decade, net cross-border flows of capital have 
 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES REPORT].  See also KPMG, KPMG’S CORPORATE AND INDIRECT 
TAX RATE SURVEY 13-14, RRD-96142 (2008). 
 2. See, e.g., David J. Lynch, Does Tax Code Encourage U.S. Companies to Cut Jobs at 
Home?, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 2008, at 1B; Dan Freedman, Critics Question President’s Pursuit of 
Overseas Tax Breaks, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 1, 2009, at 5; John D. McKinnon, Multinationals 
Dig in Heels on Overseas Tax, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009, at B7.  
 3. For example, recommendations include replacing the corporate income tax system with a 
consumption tax, integrating the corporate and individual tax systems, changing corporate statutory 
rates, repealing corporate tax deductions, and changing the timing of income inclusions and 
deductions for corporations.  See, e.g., MICHAEL GRAETZ & ALVIN C. WARREN, INTEGRATION OF 
THE U.S. CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES:  THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE REPORTS 1998; Chris Edwards, Cato Inst., No. 484, Replacing the 
Scandal-Plagued Corporate Income Tax with a Cash-Flow Tax, POL’Y ANALYSIS, Aug. 14, 2003, 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa484.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, 40, 149-64 
(2010). 
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increased over 300 percent.4  This ease with which highly elastic 
multinational corporations (MNCs) can now move their capital and 
assets to other jurisdictions has put significant pressure on the U.S. 
corporate tax system.  Not only do purely domestic transactions no 
longer dominate the economic landscape, but also the mix of 
investments has changed from primarily fixed to increasingly intangible, 
and the United States has gone from a relatively low-tax to a relatively 
high-tax jurisdiction in terms of corporate tax rates.5  Nevertheless, there 
has been no fundamental revision of the U.S. tax rules governing 
international transactions since the adoption of the subpart F regime in 
1962, and no fundamental overhaul of the general corporate tax system 
since 1986.6   
Not surprisingly, there is growing evidence that our current tax 
system is not ideally structured to deal with the challenges of an 
internationally integrated economy.7  Current data indicates that the 
United States is losing tax revenue as foreign markets become more 
attractive places to deploy capital.8  To date, Congress, the U.S. Treasury 
 
 4. Cross-border flows of capital total nearly $13 trillion worldwide, triple the $4.2 trillion in 
1996.  INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FINANCIAL STRESS, DOWNTURNS, 
AND RECOVERIES: APPENDIX 1, 4 (Oct. 2008) (net cross-border flows include direct investments, 
portfolio investments, reserve accumulations, and other investment flows). 
 5. The United States had a relatively low corporate tax rate among the major member nations 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the mid 1980s (bottom 
quartile), but now has the second highest corporate rate overall.  See CBO CORPORATE INCOME 
TAX RATES REPORT, supra note 1, at 14-15.  See also KPMG, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
 6. The Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12(a), 76 Stat. 1009 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 954 (West 2007)).  The most significant changes to the international tax 
system since the 1960s occurred in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which adopted changes to the 
income source, expense allocation and foreign tax credit rules, but these changes did not alter the 
fundamental system.  See American Bar Association, Report of the Task Force on International Tax 
Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649, 654 (Spring 2006) [hereinafter ABA INT’L TAX REFORM REPORT]. 
 7. Indeed, in testimony in 2006 before the House Ways and Means Committee, Glenn 
Hubbard, the Dean of Columbia Business School and former chair of the President’s Council of 
Economic Advisers, acknowledged that the U.S. international policies from the 1960s are not 
necessarily relevant to the United States’ present day economic and business concerns.  
International Tax Competitiveness Hearing 109-82 
 8. See Sam Goldfarb, Drop in Corporate Tax Revenue Contributes to Ballooning Deficit, 
Congressional Budget Office Says, 2008 TAX NOTES TODAY 176-1 (Sept. 9, 2008); James R. Hines, 
Jr., University of Michigan Law School, Effects of Tax Reform on Foreign Direct Investment, 
Presentation at The Brookings Institution: Tax Reform in an Open Economy (Dec. 2, 2005) 
(transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20051202tax.pdf).  See also James 
Kvaal, Removing Tax Subsidies for Foreign Investment, 111 TAX NOTES 1299 (June 12, 2006); 
Martin A. Sullivan, Latest IRS Data Show Jump in Tax Haven Profits, 105 TAX NOTES 151, 151 
(Oct. 11, 2004). 
There is troubling evidence that tax havens are already seriously undermining 
the U.S. tax base. U.S. multinationals now earn almost half of their foreign 
profits in tax havens, suggesting aggressive income shifting.  Tax havens 
3
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Department (Treasury) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have 
been unable to keep pace with the proliferation of corporate 
expatriations,9 the shifting of resources out of the U.S. tax base to low-
tax jurisdictions,10 and the rise of cross-border activities that create 
opportunities for MNCs to engage in “tax arbitrage” transactions.11  
Indeed, while U.S. tax policymakers have become increasingly aware 
that significant steps must be taken in order to maintain the United 
States’ attractiveness as a place for investment and prevent further 
erosion of the U.S. tax base, the U.S. corporate tax system continues to 
be burdened by overwhelming complexity and one of the highest 
statutory rates in the world.12   
In order to address these globalization-induced challenges, 
proposed changes to the corporate tax rules affecting MNCs have 
historically been supported by, or analyzed in relation to, any number of 
economic policy benchmarks, including capital export neutrality, capital 
import neutrality, and capital ownership neutrality.13  These constructs 
 
account for less than one percent of the world’s population but more than 
eight percent of American multinational’s foreign investments in property, 
plant, and equipment. 
James Kvall, International Tax Reform, in Options for Tax Reform 85, 92 (Center for American 
Progress ed., conference materials, Washington, D.C., Mar. 23, 2006) (available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/tax%20layout.pdf).  
 9. For a discussion of corporate expatriations, see infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 10. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-950, U.S. MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ARE CORRELATED WITH WHERE INCOME IS REPORTED 
(Aug. 12, 2008) (finding U.S. multinational corporations have been increasing the extent of their 
foreign operations to take advantage of lower tax rates in other countries). 
 11. See, e.g., Guttormet Schjelderup et al., Corporate Tax Systems, Multinational Enterprises, 
and Economic Integration 2 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1241, 2004): 
The rise in FDI and multinational firm activity is one of the most pronounced 
trends in the world economy over the last two decades . . .  [and] has worried 
policymakers and academics, since multinationals are known to shift profits 
to low tax countries and governments are prone to compete for shifty profits. 
Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Michael Joe, Shulman Promises “Aggressive Agenda” in Curbing International 
Tax Abuse, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 36-1, 3 (Feb. 26, 2009) (“We’re also going to continue to 
challenge taxpayers who are using the complexity of global commerce or global capital markets to 
push the envelope.  Where there is complexity, that is where there is potential for evasion.”).  See 
also supra note 5. 
 13. Under “capital export neutrality,” taxes do not distort location decisions when the tax on 
foreign investment is the same as that on domestic investments (often seen to support a worldwide 
tax model).  See C. Neil Stephens, A Progressive Analysis of the Efficiencies of Capital Import 
Neutrality, 30 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 159, 160-61 (1998).  Other economists have argued that 
“capital import neutrality,” or the ability of a firm to achieve the same tax rate on its foreign 
investments as a domestic firm in the same location, is the most important goal in maximizing 
worldwide economic welfare (often associated with a territorial system).  Id. at 163-64.  Mihir Desai 
and James R. Hines, Jr. expanded on this literature by offering another paradigm—“capital 
4
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are intended to foster an economically efficient allocation of worldwide 
capital.  More recently, MNCs and tax policymakers have also 
emphasized the need for any overhaul of the U.S. corporate tax system 
to take into account concerns of competitiveness.14  That is, while the 
efficient collection of revenue remains a key goal of tax regulators, it is 
also important that the United States does not unduly inhibit the 
flexibility and productivity of U.S.-based MNCs through a 
comparatively burdensome tax regime.15 
Regardless of the underlying policy benchmark employed, the 
various reform proposals that have been made to date have centered 
primarily on large-scale extrinsic changes to the overall corporate tax 
system, such as moving from a worldwide to a territorial-based regime, 
eliminating deferral, implementing integration, and relying more on a 
consumption-based tax system.16  These proposals, however, do not 
 
ownership neutrality”—pursuant to which economic efficiency is increased if an asset is able to be 
owned by the person who is in the best position to generate the maximum value from the asset.  
Mihir Desai and James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487 
(2003). 
 14. In fact, Michael Knoll introduced a new metric against which proposed changes to the 
U.S. international tax regime can be measured—competitiveness neutrality.  Taxes and 
Competitiveness (U. of Penn. Law School Inst. for Law & Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 06-28, 
2006) (stating that competitiveness neutrality is achieved when taxes do not cause competitors to 
change their relative valuations of any investments).  He acknowledged that “[a]round the world, 
the tax laws are [being] shaped by concerns with competitiveness,” because governments often 
respond favorably to arguments that certain tax policies are putting it at a competitive disadvantage.  
Id. at 1. 
 15. If global economic integration permits capital, workers and profits to migrate to low-tax 
jurisdictions, the tax base will shrink and the United States’ fiscal burden may increasingly fall on 
purely domestic U.S. companies and individual taxpayers.  Accordingly, U.S. policymakers are 
inevitably concerned about the competitive viability of U.S.-based MNCs, because the U.S. 
economic base is inextricably linked to their success and growth.  If U.S.-based MNCs are 
profitable, it can increase the United States’ tax base, spur the growth of the economy, increase the 
number of jobs and salaries for U.S. workers and benefit U.S. shareholders.  If, however, the United 
States puts a relatively large burden on U.S.-based MNCs, then over time their after-tax returns will 
be low relative to their foreign competitors.  This will lead MNCs, which are focused on 
maximizing profits and returns to investors, to take their business and capital offshore.  See, e.g., 
International Tax Competitiveness Hearing, supra note 7, at 2 (focusing on how a reformation of 
the tax system could be used to increase the competitiveness of U.S. companies operating abroad 
and stimulate the economy at home); Remarks at Secretary Henry M. Paulson’s Conference on U.S. 
Business Tax Competitiveness on July 26, 2007) [hereinafter Paulson’s Tax Competitiveness 
Conference] (examining ways in which our current business tax system affects economic growth 
and U.S. competitiveness in the global economy).  See also Heidi Glenn, Business Leaders Would 
Give up Tax Breaks for Lower Rates, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 145-3 (July 27, 2007).   
 16. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing Tax 
Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas (May 4, 2009) (available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg119.htm); Reuven Avi-Yonah, Tax Reform in the 
(Multi)National Interest, 124 TAX NOTES 389 (July 27, 2009); J. COMM. ON TAXATION, THE 
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM: BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO U.S. 
5
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focus on key intrinsic problems that exist with respect to the underlying 
rules themselves.  In this Article, I will explore another path to reform 
that would more directly address these shortcomings—the systematic 
use of principles-based rules in U.S. tax laws.17   
Generally speaking, as defined herein, principles-based rules are 
rules in which the principle underlying the rule is actually stated on the 
face of the rule.  In contrast, prescriptive rules are rules for which the 
lawmaker ex ante prescribes an outcome for a set of anticipated factual 
situations by applying, but not stating directly, the underlying 
principle.18  As currently constructed, the U.S corporate tax regime is 
 
INTERNATIONAL TAX RULES AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. BUSINESSES, JCX-22-06, at 5 
(June 22, 2006):  
Proponents argue that territorial tax systems are less complex from an 
administrative and compliance standpoint than worldwide tax systems.  It is 
true that many complicated features of a worldwide system are not necessary 
in a pure territorial system.  For example, the foreign tax credit and anti-
deferral regimes, two of the most complex features of a worldwide tax 
system, are not necessary in a pure territorial system. 
Id. 
 17. In the late 1990s, David Weisbach studied the use of standards (which, while generally 
broader, are conceptually similar to principles-based rules) in the context of tax anti-abuse 
provisions, and concluded that standards would lead to simplification because prescriptive rules, 
which dominate the tax law, are “systematically more complex.”  David Weisbach, Formalism in 
the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 867 (1999).  For a discussion of the definitional distinction 
between standards and principles-based rules, as used herein, see infra note 70 and accompanying 
text. 
 18. Indeed, in certain regulatory regimes, policymakers have recommended the expanded 
implementation of principles-based rules as a way to improve the United States’ overall systems and 
competitive position. Specifically, comprehensive reports on the declining competitiveness of our 
capital markets have suggested that incorporating more principles-based regulations could improve 
the United States’ competitive position.  See COMM. CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (Nov. 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf; OFFICES OF NEW 
YORK CITY MAYOR MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING 
NEW YORK’S AND THE U.S.’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 8 (Jan. 2007), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL116000pub/materials/library/NY_Schumer-
Bloomberg_REPORT_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter BLOOMBERG-SCHUMER REPORT]; U.S. CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 14, 2007) (together, the “Capital Markets 
Reports”).  Despite some of their differences in methodology and scope, all of these reports 
generally conclude that although the United States still generates more financial revenue than any 
other country in terms of gross dollars, other nations are growing at much faster rates.  See INTERIM 
REPORT, supra at ix; BLOOMBERG-SCHUMER REPORT, supra at ii; Capital Markets Reports, supra 
at 15.  Thus, it is asserted that absent any changes, the United States could soon lose its status as the 
financial capital of the world.  See id.  While the Capital Markets Reports acknowledge that many of 
the causes of the United States’ declining competitiveness are due to improved markets abroad, 
reduced barriers to international capital flow and the evolution of increasingly complex financial 
products that are beyond its control, they conclude that, at least to some extent, a number of the 
causes are self-imposed.  Capital Markets Reports, supra at 15-17.  In particular, the reports observe 
6
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dominated by a complex array of bright-line prescriptive rules.  Not only 
is the sheer volume of these rules staggering, but they often lack 
coherence, are both over- and under-inclusive, and fail to adequately 
adjust to evolving financial transactions.  Indeed, the U.S. system 
provides taxpayers the incentive to spend significant time and resources 
exploiting these weakness and gaps in the rules in order to counteract the 
effect of the United States’ high statutory tax rate. 
In this Article, I will analyze the effects that an increased focus on 
principles-based tax rules would have on this flawed system.  I conclude 
that principles-based rules should significantly supplement, and in many 
instances supplant, the current prescriptive tax rules in order to: (i) aid in 
the goal of simplification, (ii) close loopholes, (iii) allow the corporate 
tax rules to be more adaptable in an evolving and complex global 
market, (iv) reduce the social costs of highly structured transactions, (v) 
facilitate the ability of the United States to coordinate rules and policies 
with other jurisdictions, and (vi) provide a more effective constraint 
against highly engineered transactions.  Furthermore, because principles-
based rules will have the effect of restricting the ability of MNCs to 
engage in self-help measures to minimize their effective tax rate, they 
would serve as a gateway towards lowering our high statutory corporate 
rates, a goal that is supported by policymakers, academics, and MNCs 
alike. 
Part II of this Article will examine two key issues plaguing the 
current U.S. corporate tax regime.  Part III explores how principles-
based rules could affect our corporate tax regime and how such rules 
could be useful in responding to the challenges facing our tax 
policymakers.  It also examines how a principles-based approach could 
facilitate the lowering of statutory corporate tax rates.  
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF A PRESCRIPTIVE U.S. CORPORATE TAX REGIME 
Globalization has both magnified the competitive pressures that 
MNCs feel from their foreign competitors and increased the ability of 
jurisdictions around the world to effectively compete for their resources.  
From a policy perspective, the United States should at least strive to be 
competitively neutral, in that its tax provisions should not materially 
alter the natural flow of capital and resources or deter businesses from 
 
that our financial markets may be losing competitive ground because they are at times stifled by an 
unduly stringent and intricate regulatory system.  Id.  As a result, one of the key reforms suggested 
by the Capital Markets Reports is that the United States simplify and streamline its regulatory 
process by switching to a primarily principles-based approach to regulation.  Id. at 6-10. 
7
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incorporating or employing capital into the United States.  Any number 
of factors affect the decision of where MNCs will engage in business 
activities, including the strength of the economic markets, quality of the 
labor force, stability of the government, degree of infrastructure 
modernization, litigation environment, and geographical location.19  
Taxes, however, are also of critical, and sometimes paramount, 
importance in the decision-making process.20  In a highly competitive 
global environment where MNCs are focused on maximizing their after-
tax profits, the way in which the United States taxes MNCs 
meaningfully affects their investment decisions, their plant and 
headquarter locations, and the manner and location in which they choose 
to raise and deploy capital.21   
 
 19. See, e.g., Mauro Ghinamo et al., FDI Determination and Corporate Tax Competition in a 
Volatile World (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1965, 2007). 
 20. Michael Boskin, professor of economics at Stanford University and former chairman of 
the President’s Council of Economic Advisors, named taxes as one of three most important factors 
affecting U.S. competitiveness.  Paulson’s Tax Competitiveness Conference, supra note 15.  In 
addition, a survey in the BLOOMBERG-SCHUMER REPORT found that CEOs and senior executives 
considered a favorable corporate tax regime to be a relatively important factor in determining a 
jurisdiction’s overall competitiveness.  BLOOMBERG-SCHUMER REPORT, supra note 18, at 62. 
 21. International Tax Competitiveness Hearing, supra note 7, at 7 (statement of Glenn 
Hubbard).  Ireland’s low corporate tax rates for manufacturing and financial services are believed to 
be a primary reason for its success in attracting foreign direct investments.  Eckhard Janeba and 
Michael Smart, Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful than its Remedies, at 2 (CESifo, 
Working Paper No. 590, 2001).  In 2000, Ireland had more foreign direct investments than Japan or 
Italy (even though it has less than 4 million people).  See UNITED NATIONS, WORLD INVESTMENT 
REPORT 2001, at 291 (2001); OECD REPORT ON HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING 
GLOBAL ISSUE 21 (Apr. 1998).  Martin Sullivan has the following to say on the rise of international 
tax competition for capital: 
Tax competition is a complicated game. Sovereign governments bait their 
hooks with tax breaks and try to reel in globe-trotting taxpayers that bob and 
weave their way around the world looking for tax advantages. At the same 
time, each jurisdiction must keep an eye on other jurisdictions, which may 
adjust their taxes to promote their own economic interests at the expense of 
others.   
But it costs to play the game. Tax avoidance can drain a taxpayer's time, 
money, efficiency, and reputation. And for governments there can be losses 
in revenue and domestic political support. You are likely to see more of the 
game when the cost of playing is low. For taxpayers, that means ease of 
movement. For governments, that means a small domestic tax base.   
So where do you find the most game? It can turn up anywhere, but it is 
thickest among small countries trying to attract mobile capital. And so, for 
example, corporations in integrated Europe set up holding companies in low-
tax Luxembourg, and hundreds of billions of dollars are kept a few mouse 
clicks away from their U.S. owners in banks in the tax-free Cayman Islands.   
Globalization has broadened and deepened the presence of tax competition in 
international markets. 
8
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Unfortunately, however, the U.S. corporate tax system is 
increasingly perceived, both domestically and abroad, as being 
disadvantaged in many respects, including its relatively high statutory 
corporate tax rates and unduly complex tax provisions.  While I do not 
believe that the United States should attempt to “compete” for tax base 
with the tax haven jurisdictions22 by drastically reducing rates or 
providing disproportionate tax breaks to large MNCs, I do believe that 
the United States should strive to remain relatively in sync with other 
large Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) nations, such that our tax rates do not serve as an impediment to 
U.S. investment.  In addition, our overly complex tax provisions and the 
resulting high costs of complying with these laws are “widely viewed as 
an impediment to the ability of U.S. multinational corporations to 
effectively compete in the international business arena and place them at 
a competitive disadvantage relative to multinational corporations 
chartered in other countries.”23   
These competitive differences between the United States and other 
jurisdictions are important because the pressures that U.S.-based firms 
feel from their foreign counterparts push them to more proactively 
pursue any number of tax-saving strategies.24  On the opposite side of 
the table, tax regulators are increasingly frustrated by their less than 
successful attempts to preserve the dwindling corporate tax base.25  In a 
 
Economic Analysis: Tax Competition on the Interstate— One Bourbon, One Scotch, No Beer, 115 
TAX NOTES 822 (May 28, 2007).  See also Kristian Behrens and Pierre Picard, Tax Competition, 
Location, and Horizontal Foreign Direct Investment, at 2 (CORE Discussion Paper No. 2005/91, 
Dec. 21, 2005) (available at http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/services/psfiles/dp05/dp2005_91.pdf) (“It is 
a widely documented fact that incentives are a pervasive instrument used by governments and 
developers to attract mobile capital and foreign direct investment.”). 
 22. For instance, rates should not be reduced to a level that would lead to “harmful” tax 
competition, as is alleged of certain “tax haven” jurisdictions such as Barbados, Bermuda and the 
Cayman Islands, which level little to no income taxes on their residents.  See OECD REPORT, supra 
note 21. 
 23. Dennis R. Lassila & L. Murphy Smith, Tax Complexity and Compliance Costs of U.S. 
Multinational Corporations, 10 ADVANCES IN INT’L ACCT. 207, 207 (1997) (“Complex tax laws 
and the costs of complying with those laws are a major concern to U.S. multinational 
corporations.”). 
 24. These strategies can include self-help measures such as shifting mobile economic activity 
to lower-tax jurisdictions, transfer pricing manipulation, re-incorporating outside of the United 
States and engaging in earnings stripping and cross-border arbitrage transactions.  DAVID L. 
BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31444, FIRMS THAT INCORPORATE ABROAD FOR TAX 
PURPOSES: CORPORATE “INVERSIONS” AND “EXPATRIATION” 2 (Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter 
CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON CORPORATE INVERSIONS AND EXPATRIATIONS]. 
 25. Corporate tax revenue has dropped substantially since the 1960s.  Drop in Corporate Tax 
Revenue Contributes to Ballooning Deficit, CBO Says, 2008 TAX NOTES TODAY 176-1 (Sept. 10, 
2008).  Although corporate revenues spiked briefly from 2003 to 2006, they stabilized in fiscal 2007 
9
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very real sense, the U.S. corporate tax system represents the worst of 
both worlds: (i) a high statutory tax rate with relatively low, declining 
effective rates (and thus corporate tax revenue); and (ii) complex rules 
that fail to protect the corporate tax base, but can be manipulated, with 
significant social costs, by sophisticated MNCs to lower their effective 
rates.  While the issues plaguing our current U.S. corporate tax system 
are too numerous to discuss, I will focus on two issues that are 
particularly relevant to this Article: (i) complexity and (ii) our high 
statutory corporate rates. 
A. Complexity 
With over 1,000 forms and nearly 100,000 pages of Code and 
Treasury regulations,26 the U.S. tax system can be fairly categorized as a 
thicket of complicated rules.  As Willard Taylor notes, the current U.S. 
tax system is “a cumbersome creation of stupefying complexity” with 
“rules that lack coherence and often work at cross purposes.”27  Not 
surprisingly, simplification has been described as the “holy grail” of tax 
policy.28  Each new tax law or regulation, no matter how simple in 
 
and actually declined last year.  Id.  According to the Congressional Budget Office, corporate tax 
revenues were expected to fall from 2.7 percent of GDP in fiscal 2007 to 2.2 percent of GDP in 
fiscal 2008.  Id. 
 26. This page count is based on the CCH compilation of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
as amended, (the “Code”) and the Treasury regulations promulgated thereunder.  According to a 
recent World Bank study, the United States has the fifth-longest tax code for businesses among 
twenty highest GDP ranking countries.  WORLD BANK AND PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PAYING 
TAXES: THE GLOBAL PICTURE 16, table 2.1 (2006),  available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
documents/DB_Paying_Taxes.pdf. 
 27. Testimony of Willard Taylor, Meeting of the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform, PowerPoint slide 9 (Mar. 31, 2005), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/ 
meetings/meeting-03312005.html (last updated Aug. 12, 2005).  See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & 
Kimberly A. Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy, The Brookings 
Institute Discussion Paper, at 5 (June 2006) (“The U.S. system is also notoriously complex: 
observers are nearly unanimous in lamenting the heavy compliance burdens and the impracticality 
of coherent enforcement.”). 
 28. Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267 
(1990).  The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, which outlines ways in which the 
United States can improve its tax system, also states that it has made “simplification a priority.”  See 
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: 
PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 51 (Nov. 2005), available at 
http://taxreformpanel.gov/final-report; J. COMM. TAXATION, STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE AND 
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 
8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, JCS-3-01 (Apr. 2001).  However, some 
scholars have been more skeptical of the importance of simplification.  See, e.g., Samuel A. 
Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645, 743 (2003) (“It is a 
mistake to distinguish simplicity as a tax policy criterion distinct from efficiency.  Simplicity is part 
of what scholars mean by efficiency, nothing more.”).   
10
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isolation, seems only to add to the overall complexity of the system.  
Nevertheless, the reduction of complexity in the U.S. tax system remains 
“a worthwhile, although somewhat elusive, objective of tax reform 
efforts.”29 
There are many causes for the complexity of the U.S. corporate tax 
rules, ranging from deficiencies in our political law-making process to 
the inherently complex actors and transactions which the system must 
attempt to effectively address.30   Furthermore, in addition to the regular 
sources of complexity encountered in the purely domestic provisions of 
the Code, the tax rules governing international transactions face the 
additional pressure of having to intersect with the rules of all of the other 
taxing jurisdictions around the world.31  Any inconsistencies between the 
tax provisions of the United States and those of another country, 
including sourcing rules, debt-equity characterizations, entity 
classifications, and the timing of deductions and inclusions, can lead to 
undesirable outcomes or the opportunity for arbitrage.  Therefore, U.S. 
tax policymakers must endeavor to protect against any unintended 
results, such as the potential double taxation or double non-taxation of 
income, which lead to distortive planning behaviors by taxpayers. 
Furthermore, the core of the current corporate tax rules affecting 
MNCs were put in place in 1962 and 1986.32  Since these rules were 
enacted, legislators and tax regulators have addressed the changing 
needs of the corporate tax system by adding patchwork rules on top of 
the existing framework, with no fundamental review of, or modification 
to, the increasingly outdated system.  As a result, the United States has 
gone “from a complex to a super-complex regime. . . .”33  Indeed, the 
American Bar Association, in its recent report evaluating various tax 
 
 29. Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., & Stephen E. Shay, Reform and Simplification of 
the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules, 101 TAX NOTES 103, 105-06 (Oct. 6, 2003).  See also Lassila et 
al., supra note 23, at 235-36 (“Because tax laws have a significant impact on the activities of 
multinational corporations, tax complexity and compliance costs should be continually examined.”). 
 30. In fact, Micheal DiFronzo, IRS Deputy Associate Chief Counsel (International), was 
recently quoted as saying “complexity of business necessitates a complex rule.”  David D. Stewart, 
Drafters of Temporary Branch Regs Defend Rules’ Complexity, 58 TAX NOTES INT’L 408, 408 
(Feb. 2, 2009).  See also Charles E. McLure, Jr., Hoover Institution, Stanford University, The 
Budget Process and Tax Simplificaiton/Complication, Prepared for Presentation at the Joint AICPA 
Tax Division/ABA Tax Section “Invitational Conference on Reduction of Income Tax 
Complexity,” Washington, D.C., (Jan. 11-12, 1990), in 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 10-30 (Jan. 12, 
1990). 
 31. Peroni et al., supra note 29, at 107. 
 32. See supra note 6. 
 33. Stanford G. Ross, U.S. International Tax Policy: Where are We?  Where Should We be 
Going?, 47 TAX NOTES 331, 331 (April 16, 1990). 
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reform proposals, recognized that the “accretion of tax rules without 
periodic thorough reviews of the needs of the system” is a key source of 
complexity in the corporate tax regime.34   
Lastly, the corporate tax provisions affecting MNCs often lack an 
underlying cohesive policy direction.  Robert Peroni et al. observes that 
there is no general consensus concerning which economic model (e.g., 
capital export neutrality, capital import neutrality or capital ownership 
neutrality) should drive U.S. tax policy, and unsurprisingly, “the current 
rules reflect schizophrenia in the tax system caused by the fact that the 
U.S. tax system reflects all three economic models.”35  Furthermore, the 
international tax provisions contain conceptually inconsistent structural 
elements relating to cross-border investments, such as the selective look-
through treatment of U.S.-owned foreign corporations.36  The end result 
is that these numerous inconsistencies “lead to an incoherent tax system 
that is tremendously complex” and produce a “set of rules that lack 
coherence and often work at cross purposes in terms of achieving some 
ultimate policy goal.”37 
James Hines, in his statement at the International Tax 
Competitiveness Conference, noted that the U.S. tax rules are 
“dizzyingly complex,” and that there has to be a reason that no other 
countries are in a hurry to adopt rules anything like the U.S. rules for 
taxing international income.38  Perhaps this is because the enormous 
complexity of the U.S. corporate tax rules yields any number of 
 
 34. See ABA INT’L TAX REFORM REPORT, supra note 6, at 690. 
 35. Peroni et al., supra note 29, at 106-07.  For example, the residence-based worldwide 
system itself is supported by capital export neutrality principles.  On the other hand, the deferral 
regime moves more in the direction of capital import neutrality. 
 36. See id.:  
The code has two inconsistent approaches to how it views a U.S. corporation 
that owns stock in a foreign corporation. In some instances, under the deferral 
privilege, a U.S. shareholder is allowed to avoid U.S. tax on the profits of a 
foreign corporation until they are repatriated, thereby treating the U.S. 
shareholder as the owner of stock in the foreign corporation and the foreign 
corporation as an entity distinct from its U.S. shareholder. By contrast, other 
code rules, such as the indirect foreign tax credit allowed by sections 902 and 
960 and the look-through rules in sections 904(d)(3) and (d)(4), treat a U.S. 
corporate shareholder that owns at least 10 percent of the voting stock as 
equivalent to operating a foreign branch and therefore as, in effect, the owner 
of the foreign corporation's underlying assets and income.     
Id. 
 37. Id. at 107-08. 
 38. James R. Hines, Jr., University of Michigan Law School, Speaker at Paulson’s Tax 
Competitiveness Conference, supra note 15.  In addition, Safra Catz, President and CFO of Oracle 
Corporation, Panelist at Paulson’s Tax Competitiveness Conference, supra note 15, noted that the 
complexity of the U.S. tax system is “outrageous.” 
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efficiency, administrative, and equity difficulties, including: (i) increased 
compliance costs to taxpayers; (ii) challenging and expensive 
administration and enforcement of the tax laws; and (iii) the proliferation 
of complex and high-friction tax planning. 
First, the overwhelming complexity of the corporate tax rules can 
result in extremely high compliance costs for taxpayers, even for those 
who are merely trying to comply with (and not manipulate) the laws.39  
The U.S. tax system is estimated to impose a hidden compliance cost on 
taxpayers of over $260 billion each year.40  This does not include the 
countless dollars spent by MNCs on “tax planning” in and around these 
rules.  Not only that, but “the cost of compliance with the international 
rules is understood to be proportionately much higher than for the 
domestic rules.”41  This creates an extraordinary amount of social waste 
and also can result in lower profits for MNCs, higher prices of goods and 
services for customers, and decreased amounts of capital available for 
domestic and foreign investment.42  As a result, these effects can impair 
the ability of U.S.-based MNCs to remain competitive in the global 
economy.43  Jim Owens, Chairman and CEO of Caterpillar, Inc., stated 
that “tax makes a substantial difference in U.S. competitiveness,” and he 
specifically was troubled by the complexity of a tax system that results 
in Caterpillar spending $40 million annually on tax planning, 
preparation, and filing.44 
Second, the high level of complexity in the U.S. tax rules makes the 
administration of the tax system more difficult and costly for the 
government.45  Not only does the sheer volume and intricacy of the 
 
 39. “By reducing complexity, the tax system would no longer be the substantial impediment 
to international trade that it now is.”  Lassila et al., supra note 23, at 209-10 (citations omitted). 
 40. SCOTT HODGE, J. SCOTT MOODY, & WENDY WARCHOLIK, TAX FOUND., ISSN 1068-0306, 
SPECIAL REPORT: THE RISING COST OF COMPLYING WITH THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1 (Dec. 1, 
2005), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/sr138.pdf. 
 41. See ABA INT’L TAX REFORM REPORT, supra note 6, at 717.  See also Lassila et al., supra 
note 23, at 209-10 (finding in results of a survey of the 1000 largest U.S. MNCs that corporate tax 
preparation is very complex and quite costly and is more burdensome to corporations with a high 
degree of international business). 
 42. Peroni et al., supra note 29, at 105-06. 
 43. Id. 
 44. James W. Owens, Chairman and CEO, Caterpillar, Inc., Panelist at Paulson’s Tax 
Competitiveness Conference, supra note 15.  In addition, Mobil Oil reported that completing and 
filing its 1993 U.S. federal income tax return cost $10 million and that the return was 6300 pages 
long.  See Lassila et al., supra note 23, at 209. 
 45. Peroni et al., supra note 29.  In addition, Fred Goldberg stated at Paulson’s Tax 
Competitiveness Conference, supra note 15, that “there is a perception, accurate in my view, that 
the current international tax system is grotesquely complicated from the prospective of 
13
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corporate tax provisions create problems for administrators, but these 
issues are also compounded by the often convoluted structures that 
sophisticated taxpayers create in order to achieve tax-favorable results.  
At times it can be difficult, or nearly impossible, for the IRS to fully 
unravel the transactional web that is woven in order to accurately 
decipher the true economics and intentions of the taxpayer.  As noted by 
David Schizer, complex tax structures can be arranged to “have 
extraneous pieces that are included solely to befuddle auditors” and 
when “[f]acing a large and complicated return, auditors try to intuit what 
questions to ask, without really knowing where the bodies are buried.”46  
Thus, the corporate tax provisions are “in many respects too complex for 
many [IRS] auditors to understand and therefore for the government to 
audit effectively.”47 
Lastly, the complex tax rules often “engender elaborate and 
expensive tax-planning maneuvers and inefficient structuring of business 
transactions.”48  As discussed more fully below, the more complicated 
the Code, the easier it is for taxpayers to find loopholes to exploit, or 
strategies to circumvent, various tax provisions.49  Former IRS 
Commissioner Mark Everson noted that as “the Code continues to 
expand, becoming more complex and challenging to administer, large 
businesses and wealthy individuals are able to utilize every available 
resource to explore opportunities to reduce their tax liability by using the 
most intricate and complicated Code provisions . . . .”50  Not only is this 
kind of tax planning highly inefficient, but it can also result in inequities 
 
administration and compliance . . . .”  Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
LLP, Moderator and Contributor at Paulson’s Tax Competitiveness Conference, supra note 15. 
 46. See David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 335 (Spring 2006).  
See also JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 1 REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION 
AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS, JCS-3-03, at 373-74 (Feb. 2003): 
In structuring complex international investments and operations, prudent tax 
planning typically requires a U.S.-based multinational enterprise to use a 
combination of many different entities in many different jurisdictions, even if 
the enterprise’s tax planning goals are limited to the generally 
unobjectionable ones of deferring U.S. Federal income tax on active, non-
subpart-F income until such income is repatriated, and mitigating the double 
taxation of foreign income to the extent allowable under the foreign tax credit 
and the U.S. tax treaty network. 
Id. 
 47. See ABA INT’L TAX REFORM REPORT, supra note 6, at 717. 
 48. Peroni et al., supra note 29, at 105-06. 
 49. See infra section III.B.1. 
 50. Mark Everson, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv., Before the S. Comm. Homeland Sec. & 
Gov’t Affairs’ Permanent Subcomm. Investigations Hearing on Offshore Abuses: The Enablers, the 
Tools, and Offshore Secrecy (Aug. 1, 2006). 
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to taxpayers who do not have the resources to engage in sophisticated 
tax planning and to those who lack the international diversification to 
readily move profits and capital offshore.51  
B. High Statutory Corporate Rate 
The most common complaint against the United States in terms of 
“competitiveness” is its relatively high corporate tax rates.52  Following 
the significant corporate tax rate reductions implemented as part of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986,53 the United States had a relatively low 
corporate tax rate in comparison to other OECD countries.54  
Subsequently, however, corporate tax rates have been coming down 
around the world.55  In 2000, only five OECD countries had higher 
statutory corporate income tax rates than the United States (Chart A).   
Since then, all five of those countries have reduced their top statutory 
rates, and four of them significantly lowered their rates to below the U.S. 
rate. In fact, between 2000 and 2008, the vast majority of the OECD 
countries significantly reduced their statutory corporate tax rates.  
Today, Japan is the only OECD country that has a higher statutory 
corporate tax rate than the United States.56   
 
 51. See ABA INT’L TAX REFORM REPORT, supra note 6, at 717 (these rules “are unfair to 
those who do not have foreign income and to those who do have foreign income but do not engage 
in sophisticated tax planning.”).  There is also a notion that a complex tax system that requires MNC 
managers to create convoluted transactional structures in order to achieve tax avoidance goals is not 
ideal from a corporate law perspective because such structures give managers additional capacity to 
hide self-dealing from shareholders. Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and 
International Charter Competition 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (2008) (demonstrating that tax-
motivated corporate locational decisions can lead to an efficiency cost to the extent that MNCs are 
steered into suboptimal legal regimes from a corporate law standpoint).   
 52. There are obviously any number of considerations other than competitiveness that go into 
the formulation of a tax system, including revenue demands, fairness, economic efficiency and 
political considerations.  Accordingly, while this Article will not specifically address how 
competitiveness, as a policy goal, should fit in terms of our nation’s overall political agenda, I will 
assume that competitiveness is at least a goal that is important to the United States, given its 
potential impact on our economy and in light of the increasing amount of attention it has received 
by tax policymakers and scholars alike. 
 53. The top corporate rate was reduced from 46 percent to 34 percent.  Tax Reform Act of 
1986, PL 99-514, § 601, 100 Stat. 2085, 2249 (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 11 (2006)). 
 54. See CBO CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES REPORT 50, supra note 5. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Similarly, the Canadian C.D. Howe Institute issued a report ranking the corporate tax 
competitiveness of eighty-one countries.  Canadian C.D. Howe Institute, Canadian Report Ranks 
U.S. Low on Corporate Tax Competitiveness, 2006 TAX NOTES TODAY 189-7 (Sept. 28, 2006).  The 
United States came out near the bottom of the pack, with an average effective tax rate on capital 
higher than seventy-five of the eighty-one countries ranked.  Id. 
15
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Chart A 
Rank Country 2000 2006 2008 Change % Change
1 Japan 40.9 39.5 39.5 -1.4 -3.3%
2 United States 39.4 39.3 39.3 -0.1 -0.4%
3 France 37.8 34.4 34.4 -3.4 -8.9%
4 Belgium 40.2 36.0 34.0 -6.2 -15.4%
5 Canada 44.6 36.1 33.5 -11.1 -24.9%
6 Luxembourg 37.5 29.6 30.4 -7.1 -19.0%
7 Germany 52.0 38.9 30.2 -21.8 -42.0%
8 Australia 34.0 30.0 30.0 -4.0 -11.8%
9 New Zealand 33.0 33.0 30.0 -3.0 -9.1%
10 Spain 35.0 35.0 30.0 -5.0 -14.3%
11 Mexico 35.0 29.0 28.0 -7.0 -20.0%
12 Norway 28.0 28.0 28.0 0.0 0.0%
13 Sweden 28.0 28.0 28.0 0.0 0.0%
14 United Kingdom 30.0 30.0 28.0 -2.0 -6.7%
15 Italy 37.0 33.0 27.5 -9.5 -25.7%
16 Korea 30.8 27.5 27.5 -3.3 -10.7%
17 Portugal 35.2 27.5 26.5 -8.7 -24.7%
18 Finland 29.0 26.0 26.0 -3.0 -10.3%
19 Netherlands 35.0 29.6 25.5 -9.5 -27.1%
20 Austria 34.0 25.0 25.0 -9.0 -26.5%
21 Denmark 32.0 28.0 25.0 -7.0 -21.9%
22 Greece 40.0 29.0 25.0 -15.0 -37.5%
23 Switzerland 24.9 21.3 21.2 -3.7 -15.0%
24 Czech Republic 31.0 24.0 21.0 -10.0 -32.3%
25 Hungary 18.0 16.0 20.0 2.0 11.1%
26 Turkey 33.0 30.0 20.0 -13.0 -39.4%
27 Poland 30.0 19.0 19.0 -11.0 -36.7%
28 Slovak Republic 29.0 19.0 19.0 -10.0 -34.5%
29 Iceland 30.0 18.0 15.0 -15.0 -50.0%
30 Ireland 24.0 12.5 12.5 -11.5 -47.9%
33.6 28.4 26.6 -7.0 -20.2%
Source: OECD
2000 to 2008
OECD Averages
Corporate Tax Rates, Change From 2000 to 2008
Sorted by Statutory Rate in 2008
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The impact of the United States’ high corporate tax rates on MNCs 
is further complicated by its worldwide system of taxation.57  Because 
U.S.-based residents are ultimately taxed on their worldwide income and 
are supposed to pay residual tax to account for any differences in tax 
rates in the foreign jurisdiction, they do not naturally benefit from lower 
rates that could be achieved by investing directly in other lower-rate 
jurisdictions.58  Thus, the U.S. corporate tax rules can result in the 
imposition of a burden on U.S.-based MNCs that is not imposed on 
many of their foreign counterparts.59   
MNCs are under significant competitive pressures to lower the tax 
costs of their U.S. and foreign business activities.  As sophisticated 
MNCs have become more elastic, they are increasingly focused on, and 
able to react more quickly and efficiently to, differences in the markets.  
MNCs do not feel particularly restricted by their geographical location 
and are able easily to move resources and profits from jurisdictions they 
perceive as overly burdensome to ones they consider more optimal.60 
 
 57. Under a worldwide tax system, such as that employed by the United States, residents are 
taxable on their worldwide income, no matter where that income is derived.  26 C.F.R. § 1.1-1(b) 
(2008).  On the other hand, non-resident MNCs are only subject to tax on income earned in the 
United States.  26 U.S.C. § 882 (2006).  The potential double taxation of MNCs under a worldwide 
system by both the resident and source countries on foreign income is mitigated through the 
allowance of a credit in the resident country for taxes paid to the foreign source country.  In the 
United States, the credit for foreign taxes is limited to an MNC’s U.S. tax liability, although cross 
crediting is generally permitted such that excess credits generated from income earned in high-tax 
countries can be used to offset additional taxes owed on income earned in low-tax jurisdictions.  In 
contrast, under a territorial system, a corporation pays tax only to the country in which the income is 
generated.  Accordingly, it does not owe any tax to its resident country on its foreign income.  Most 
European countries, such as France, Sweden, Luxembourg, Spain, Germany, and (to some extent) 
the United Kingdom, as well as countries such as Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore, 
have adopted territorial-based systems.  Japan also has a worldwide tax system.   
 58. However, MNCs are often able to structure their affairs to avoid the residual tax that they 
are supposed to incur on their foreign-source income by engaging in highly structured transactions 
and/or permanently shifting income offshore.  See DEP’T TREASURY, EARNINGS STRIPPING, 
TRANSFER PRICING, AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES 1-2 (2007), available at 
http://treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ajca2007.pdf.  For example, because the taxation on 
foreign income is deferred until such income is brought back into the United States, MNCs attempt 
to avoid the residual tax that would be imposed on those earnings if they are brought back to the 
United States.  Id. at 2.  In an effort to reclaim some of these “trapped” profits, Section 421 of the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (“JOBS Act”), Pub. L. 108-357, added a temporary provision 
intended to encourage the repatriation of certain low-taxed foreign earnings.  American Jobs Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 421, 118 Stat. 1418, 1458-59 (2004). 
 59. David Sicular et al., Report on Outbound Inversion Transactions, 1014 N.Y. ST. B.A. TAX 
SECTION 1, 9 (May 24, 2002).  See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage, 
and the International Tax Regime, 61 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 130 (2007). 
 60. Historically, the United States benefited from being a “home market” for many of the 
world’s largest MNCs.  Haroldene Wunder, The Effect of International Tax Policy on Foreign 
Direct Investments, 35 TAX NOTES INT’L 733, 733 (Aug. 23, 2004).  Two recent phenomena, 
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Indeed, the wave of corporate “inversions” or “expatriations”61 in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, in which U.S.-based MNCs moved their 
headquarters (but not operations) outside of the United States,62 was 
believed to be symptomatic of the relatively high tax burden certain 
U.S.-based MNCs believed that the U.S. tax system placed on their 
firms.63  MNCs such as Cooper Industries anticipated a $55 million 
annual U.S. tax savings, and Ingersoll-Rand expected $40 million of 
 
however, are greatly mitigating this traditional home market advantage.  First, there is evidence that 
foreign-based MNCs are representing an increasing presence in the global economy.  Id.  In fact, 
although U.S.-based MNCs represented almost half of the world’s largest MNCs during the 1960s, 
today they represent only one-fifth.  Id.  Second, this smaller portion of U.S.-based MNCs is 
increasingly willing to invest and engage in large multi-billion dollar transactions abroad and is 
much less likely to feel in any way tied to their home market as a primary locus for executing 
transactions, raising capital, and employing workers.  Michael Kirsch, The Congressional Response 
to Corporate Expatriations:  The Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of 
Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 478 (Winter 2005).  The amount of truly captive 
resources is shrinking and an increasing amount of their tax base can be shifted to locations that 
maximize the MNCs’ after-tax profits.  Id. at 480.  Thus, open fiscal borders, worldwide economic 
development, and capital mobility are creating an environment in which elasticity is very high.  See 
id. at 477-80. 
 61. U.S.-based MNCs alter their organizational structures by substituting the U.S.-based 
parent of the MNC’s group for a foreign-based parent corporation (typically a country with low 
corporate tax rates). See U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, CORPORATE INVERSION 
TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2 (May 2002).  There are typically two sources of 
potential savings from these types of transactions: (i) elimination of tax on foreign-source income if 
the foreign U.S. parent is subject to a territorial tax system and (ii) through earnings-stripping or 
other similar transactions, they are able to shift historically U.S.-source income to the lower rate 
foreign jurisdiction.  See EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 58, at 1-2.  A detailed analysis of 
inversions can be found in Mihir A. Desai and James R. Hines, Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: 
Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 409 (Sept. 2002). 
 62. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON CORPORATE INVERSIONS AND EXPATRIATIONS, supra note 
24, at summary (“Over the past several years, reports indicate that an increasing number of U.S. 
firms have altered their structure by substituting a foreign parent corporation for a domestic one . . . 
and the recent inversions do not appear to be accompanied by substantive shifts of economic 
activity from the United States. . . . ”).  Earnings-stripping transactions are another common way to 
shift high-tax U.S. profits to low- or no-tax foreign jurisdictions.  See EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra 
note 58, at 1-2.  A common structure involves a loan between a parent and a subsidiary.  See id. at 
9-10.  The U.S. borrower entity deducts the interest expense and the interest income is taxed to the 
foreign lender at the lower foreign rate, assuming that a treaty eliminates the 30 percent 
withholding.  Id.  The earnings-stripping provisions, which deny the interest deduction for interest 
payments to related parties, only apply after certain thresholds of interest payments and debt levels 
are exceeded, and thus this type of shifting is still pervasive.  See I.R.C. § 163(j) (2006). 
 63. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON CORPORATE INVERSIONS AND EXPATRIATIONS, supra note 
24.  It is also believed that certain cross-border mergers, in which the foreign-based corporation 
becomes the parent after the merger (e.g., the Daimler-Chrysler transaction), are made more 
attractive by the fact that worldwide taxation lowers the relative value of U.S. companies.  See, e.g., 
Daniel J. Mitchell, Heritage Calls for International Tax Reform, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 188-78 
(Sept. 25, 2003). 
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savings in the first year and larger amounts thereafter.64  Although 
legislation contained in the 2004 JOBS Act is aimed at curtailing 
expatriations,65 this inversion activity is a signal of the magnitude of the 
competitive pressures that a number of U.S.-based MNCs felt, given that 
they believed it worthwhile to incur the tax66 and other costs associated 
with relocating to a foreign residence in order to avoid U.S. taxation of 
their worldwide income.67 
Because of the pressure on U.S.-based MNCs to maximize their 
after-tax returns to investors, our relatively higher statutory rates almost 
inevitably result in their adoption of aggressive self-help measures, 
including the exploitation of loopholes, to reduce their effective 
corporate tax rates.68  Indeed, notwithstanding the United States’ higher 
 
 64. Kirsch, supra note 60, at 480-81. 
 65. After numerous legislative attempts to curtail this activity in the past failed, finally tax 
legislation aimed at prohibiting or limiting inversions was contained in the JOBS Act.  American 
Jobs Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 421, 118 Stat. 1418, 1458-59 (2004).  This provision 
applies to inversions occurring after March 4, 2003 and provides two levels of penalty: (i) for 
foreign parents that are at least 80 percent owned by the former domestic parent’s owner, that entity 
is treated as domestic; (ii) for foreign parents that are at least 60, but less than 80, percent owned, 
the parent is not treated as domestic, but any toll taxes that apply to transfers of assets cannot be 
offset by foreign tax credits or net operating losses.  I.R.C. § 7874 (2006). 
 66. I.R.C. Section 367 can require the recognition of gain on a transfer of assets from a U.S. 
corporation to a foreign corporation.  I.R.C. § 367 (2006). 
 67. International Tax Competitiveness Hearing, supra note 7, at 13-14 (statement of James R. 
Hines, Jr., Ph.D., Professor of Business Economics, University of Michigan): 
The wave of corporate inversions from 1996 to 2002 reflects these incentives 
as a number of American firms thought it worthwhile to incur the tax and 
other costs associated with relocating to foreign residence in order to avoid 
U.S. taxation of their worldwide incomes.   
     The corporate inversion phenomenon is not quantitatively huge in and of 
itself.  Only 25 large firms inverted.  It is instead a signal of the magnitude of 
incentives created by the U.S. residence taxation.  For every firm that changes 
its nationality by inverting, there were several others whose U.S. tax 
liabilities or potential tax liabilities on foreign income were significant 
enough to make them contemplate inverting or else never establishing U.S. 
residency in the first place.   
     Taxation on the basis of residence makes most sense when residence is an 
immutable characteristic of a person or a firm.  In the global economy, 
residence is a matter of choice not only because people and companies can 
move but also because the weight of economic activity is itself responsive to 
tax burdens, even in circumstances in which people in firms never change 
their tax residences. 
Id. 
 68. It is estimated that for non-financial companies the average effective corporate tax rate 
(i.e., the percentage of total corporate profits paid to the U.S. government) is almost nine percentage 
points lower than the top statutory rate.  JOEL FRIEDMAN, CTR ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 
THE DECLINE OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX REVENUES 6 (Oct. 24, 2003), http://www.cbpp.org/10-
16-03tax.pdf.  Sophisticated MNCs often engage in complex cross-border arbitrage transactions in 
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statutory rates, the average OECD country receives 3 percent of its GDP 
from corporate tax revenues, while the United States generates closer to 
only 2 percent.69  Reuven Avi-Yonah and Kimberly Clausing observe 
that there are several reasons for the relatively lower amount of U.S. 
corporate tax revenue, including “the increasingly aggressive use of 
corporate tax shelters . . . and stronger incentives for tax avoidance, 
which tend to increase as the U.S. tax rate is high relative to other 
countries.”70  Thus, as the gap between the U.S. corporate crate and 
other jurisdictions continues to widen, the more avidly U.S.-based 
MNCs will pursue aggressive tax planning devices.  Accordingly, it will 
be difficult for the United States to both maintain these higher corporate 
tax rates and prevent distortive taxpayer behaviors, particularly in the 
absence of any other significant tax policy changes.71 
III. THE ROLE OF PRINCIPLES-BASED RULES IN CORPORATE TAX 
REFORM  
A fundamental policy decision by U.S. tax lawmakers to move 
towards a more balanced principles-based regime could significantly 
mitigate many of the challenges facing the current system and enable the 
United States to lower its statutory corporate rate in a revenue-neutral 
way.  The current U.S corporate tax system is burdened by a thicket of 
 
order to achieve tax savings, and substantial empirical evidence now exists that MNCs are also able 
to significantly reduce their corporate tax burden through transfer pricing, earnings stripping and 
other profit shifting strategies.  Sam Bucovetsky & Andreas Haufler, Tax Competition When Firms 
Choose Their Organizational Form: Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals be Closed? (CESifo, 
Working Paper No. 1625, 2005).  See also Kimberly A. Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax 
Avoidance and Tax Policy, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 703, 721 (2009) (suggesting that U.S. corporate tax 
revenues in 2004 were approximately 35 percent lower due to income shifting).  In fact, in recent 
years many high-tech, pharmaceutical and other soft asset MNCs are moving a significant portion of 
their profits offshore through a variety of arrangements that result in the transfer of valuable 
intangibles to related foreign entities for inadequate consideration in order to reduce their effective 
tax rates.  Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Drug Firms Move Profits to Save Billions, 112 
TAX NOTES 472, 472 (Aug. 7, 2006). 
 69. Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 27, at 5, 10 (“despite a corporate tax rate one standard 
deviation above that of other OECD countries, the U.S. corporate tax system raises relatively little 
revenue, due in part to the shifting of income outside of the U.S. tax base”).   
 70. Id. at 11.  Cf. William Barker, Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition: 
Overcome the Contradictions 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 161, 189 (2002) (“The lower the rate and 
the less elastic the tax base, the lower the effect taxation will have on economic decision-making.” 
(citing VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 4 (1995)). 
 71. For a general discussion of rate lowering proposals, see Harry Grubert & Rosanne 
Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border 
Income 5 (draft Dec. 12, 2006) (suggesting that the “optimal” rate structure would include a 
corporate rate of 28 percent), http://econweb.rutgers.edu/altshule/research/200626.pdf. 
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prescriptive rules.72  These complex rules are challenging and expensive 
to administer, impose extraordinarily high compliance costs on MNCs, 73 
and ultimately fail to adequately respond to the rapidly changing global 
marketplace and to taxpayers seeking to exploit their weaknesses.  Based 
on the analysis that follows, I believe that not only could the use of more 
principles help address these issues, but other important benefits could 
be realized as well.  Accordingly, the implementation of more 
principles-based rules should be given consideration in any 
contemplated tax reform proposals.   
A. Principles-Based Rules versus Prescriptive Rules 
The debate over the use of principled versus prescriptive 
rulemaking is gaining renewed traction in other areas of the law,74 and 
there are certainly advantages and disadvantages to each regulatory 
approach.  For definitional purposes, I will assume that a principles-
based rule sets forth an explicit general standard governing which 
conduct is or is not permissible.  On the other hand, a prescriptive rule 
determines ex ante what specific conduct is or is not permissible by 
detailing the treatment of all expected factual situations.75  For example, 
 
 72. Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 
339, 363 (Fall 2005) (“The tax system is the quintessential rule-based, as opposed to a standards-
based, legal regime.”). 
 73. Lassila et al., supra note 23, at 207 (showing that corporations with a higher degree of 
internationalism had even higher compliance costs). 
 74. For example, the accounting and securities regulation fields are currently undergoing 
extensive debate on this topic.  See, e.g., Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and 
Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L. J. 1, 1 (2008) (“The significance and 
wisdom of ‘principles-based’ securities regulation may be among the most pressing questions facing 
securities regulators internationally today.”); George J. Benston, Michael Bromwich, & Alfred 
Wagenhofer, Principles- versus Rules-Based Accounting Standards: The FASB’s Standard Setting 
Strategy, 42 ABACUS 165 (June 2006).  This debate has also been going on for some time in the tax 
law.  See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the 
Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673 (1969); Louis Kaplow, Rules versus 
Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Weisbach, supra note 17; FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (Clarendon L. ed., Oxford University Press 1993) (1991). 
 75. These definitions of principles-based rules and prescriptive rules are similar to those given 
to the traditional “standards” and “rules” terms as defined by Louis Kaplow.  See Kaplow, supra 
note 74, at 562.  Under his definition, a standard is a provision in which the determination of content 
is made ex post and a rule is a provision in which the determination of content is made ex ante.  Id.  
Generally speaking, a prescriptive rule will have the characteristics of a “rule” in that its content is 
determined ex ante.  In addition, a standard will likely qualify under my definition of a principles-
based rule.  However, although similar, as I define principles-based rules, there are certain 
principles-based rules which may be “rules.”  That is, even though the determination of the content 
can be made ex ante, the underlying principle is in fact articulated as the rule directly in the 
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in regulating driving speeds, a principles-based rule could provide that 
drivers are allowed to drive at any speed that is safe and reasonable 
given the existing traffic and weather conditions and time of day.  A 
prescriptive rule could provide that the speed limit is sixty miles per 
hour.  As another example, in regulating chemical disposal, a principles-
based rule could provide that no company can dispose of any chemical 
waste without the use of specially approved containers if such waste 
could be harmful to humans, animals or the environment.  On the other 
hand, a prescriptive rule could merely mandate the proper disposal of a 
specific list of chemicals, which scientists have already pre-determined 
are harmful.   
Advocates of principles-based rules generally believe that these 
types of rules more adequately convey the underlying policies that the 
rules are intending to effectuate.76  For example, it is clear that in the 
traffic example, lawmakers would like to ensure that drivers are moving 
at safe speeds, and in the chemical disposal example, that lawmakers 
want to protect their citizens and the environment from harmful 
substances.  With the prescriptive rules, by contrast, you must deduce 
what underlying policy the law is intending to implement.  You must 
assume that transportation officials, in studying various relevant factors, 
have determined that sixty miles per hour is the speed that the majority 
of drivers can reach without posing a significant danger to themselves 
and other drivers.  In addition, principles-based regulations may provide 
the regulated entities with more flexibility in choosing their method of 
compliance.  Drivers, for instance, can make their own determination, 
based on their level of comfort and examination of the facts, as to what 
speed they deem safe to travel.  Principles-based rules are also typically 
more adaptable to changing circumstances and various factual situations.  
If a new chemical is developed that is known to be dangerous to humans, 
that chemical will automatically be covered under the principles-based 
rule, whereas lawmakers would have to amend the prescriptive rule in 
order to add the new chemical to the list of covered substances.  
Relatedly, the cost of implementing principles-based rules is generally 
lower than that for prescriptive rules, because with prescriptive-based 
 
applicable provision.  Although in certain situations the delineation between prescriptive and 
principled rules may become blurred, I do not believe that difficulties in labeling on the margin 
should affect the overall analysis or conclusions regarding the effects of implementing more 
principles-based rules.  Indeed, there has been much debate over what the precise definition of these 
terms should be, even though the general meaning accorded them is largely the same.  See, e.g., 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in 
Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007). 
 76. See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 74, at 703; Weisbach, supra note 17, at 861-62. 
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rules, the regulator must work to identify all of the transactions or 
behaviors that fall within a rule and those that do not.77  
On the other hand, proponents of prescriptive rules argue that they 
allow for a much higher certainty of behavioral expectations.78  For 
example, drivers under the prescriptive rule would know ex ante that in 
order to comply with the law, they could not drive in excess of sixty 
miles per hour.  On the other hand, even after a driver has assessed all of 
the relevant conditions and determined his or her appropriate speed, he 
or she would not be certain that they had complied with the principles-
based law until after the fact when a relevant enforcement agency 
determined otherwise (e.g. a state trooper pulls them over).  
Accordingly, prescriptive rules have the potential to result in 
significantly lower compliance and enforcement costs.  Once the actor is 
made aware of the prescriptive rule, they may need no further guidance 
before participating in the regulated behavior, and once they have 
engaged in the behavior, it will be clear whether or not they have 
complied.  On the other hand, with a principles-based rule, it may take 
considerable time and cost for an actor to evaluate whether the 
anticipated behavior will be “reasonable” or “safe” or otherwise comply 
with whatever principled rule has been enunciated.  Similarly, in order 
for the applicable enforcement entity to be able to sanction the actor, it 
must again compile all of the relevant facts and circumstances and 
conclude that its determination of the content of the principles-based rule 
is meaningfully different from the actual activity engaged in by the 
actor.  Prescriptive rules also are considered to have the advantage of 
ensuring more consistency in behavior and enforcement across firms or 
individuals.  A driver can be assured that even though he or she cannot 
drive over sixty miles per hour without violating the law, no one else can 
either. 
B. Factors Affecting the Use of Principles-Based Rules in U.S. Tax Law 
In actuality, the pros and cons of either approach to regulation are 
not so easily delineated.  Generalizations about the utility and attributes 
of principles or prescriptive rules can depend greatly on the actors in—
and content, dynamics, and regulatory goals of—the specific area of law.  
 
 77. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 74, at 562 (“Rules are more costly to promulgate than 
standards because rules involve advance determinations of the law’s content. . . .”). 
 78. The “big three” justifications for prescriptive rules are certainty, predictability, and 
reliance in the system.  Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying Judicial 
Doctrines, 54 SMU L. REV. 9, 10 (2001). 
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With respect to corporate tax law in particular, I believe the 
effectiveness of either form of rule is highly influenced by any number 
of factors, including:  (i) the relative complexity of prescriptive rules, (ii) 
the absolute level of complexity of the regulatory regime, (iii) the 
prevalence of the regulated behavior and pace of change in the 
underlying regulated field, (iv) the desirability of uncertainty, (v) the 
frequency and availability of up-to-date guidance, (vi) the level of 
complexity actually employed by the enforcers of the rules, and (vii) the 
possibility for the regulatory system to overlap and interact with a 
distinct set of rules from an entirely different regime.79   
1.  The Relative Complexity of Prescriptive Rules 
In order to be able to achieve the goal of reducing complexity, it 
must first be accepted that principles-based rules are systematically less 
complex than prescriptive rules.  Stanley Surrey first posited that 
standards would allow the tax law to be simpler than rules.  He believed 
that broader principled anti-abuse provisions would “save the tax system 
from the far greater proliferation of detail than would be necessary if the 
tax avoider could succeed merely by bringing his scheme within the 
literal language of [rules].”80  Weisbach expanded on this proposition 
and definitively concluded that rules are “systematically more complex 
than standards.”81  I agree with these assessments in relation to 
principles-based rules.82  
The essence of a prescriptive rule is that it must be able to mandate, 
ex ante, the proper treatment for a particular transaction.  It attempts to 
prescribe the appropriate treatment of all expected factual situations.  A 
prime example of this phenomenon can be found in the passive-activity 
loss rules under Section 469 of Code and the accompanying Treasury 
Regulations.83  In an attempt to account for every conceivable scenario 
 
 79. Although in the context of standards (rather than principles-based rules), factor (i) has 
been analyzed in depth by Weisbach, and factors (ii) through (vi) have previously been considered 
by Louis Kaplow.  Weisbach, supra note 17; Kaplow, supra note 74.  Factor (vii) is an additional 
consideration that I believe is also relevant in assessing the use of principles-based rules in the 
regulation of international transactions.   
 80. Surrey, supra note 74, at 707 n.31. 
 81. Weisbach, supra note 17, at 867. 
 82. A notable contrary opinion is Kaplow who believes that a rule and a standard that lead to 
identical outcomes necessarily have an equal level of complexity.  Kaplow, supra note 74, at 586-
88. 
 83. I.R.C. § 469 (2006).  Section 469 generally provides that deductions from passive trade or 
business activities of a taxpayer, to the extent they exceed income from all such passive activities 
(exclusive of portfolio income), may not be deducted against other income.  § 469(a)(1).  Similarly, 
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that a taxpayer engaged in a passive trade or business could encounter, 
the IRS initially set forth an extremely detailed and complex series of 
tests for the determination of the scope of a taxpayer’s “activities,” 
which spanned 60 pages.84  After the regulations were highly criticized 
by tax practitioners as being “overly long and complex,” the Secretary 
allowed the temporary regulation to expire and ultimately promulgated 
in the final version of Treasury Regulation Section 1.469-4, a more 
principles-based facts-and-circumstances test for the determination of 
the scope of a taxpayer's activities under the passive-income rules.85  Not 
surprisingly, these regulations span only eight pages, representing an 87 
percent reduction in length.86  Just as importantly, these final rules have 
been successful in shutting down abusive passive activity loss 
transactions.   
As evidenced by the passive activity loss rules, given the infinite 
number of potential transactions that savvy taxpayers and their advisors 
are able to develop, in order for prescriptive rules to be effective in 
fulfilling their purpose, they must specify the treatment of a greater 
number of transactions.  Otherwise, gaps in the tax law will emerge.  
Therefore, prescriptive rules can “less afford to overlook uncommon 
transactions than can standards.”87  Principles-based rules, on the other 
hand, are able to encompass a larger subset of transactions, because the 
articulated principle can apply to even unknown situations.  Thus, any 
given principle has the potential to govern the treatment of both common 
and uncommon (or yet unknown) transactions.  Accordingly, with 
respect to the tax law, I believe that prescriptive rules will generally be 
more complex than principles-based rules. 
2.  The Underlying Complexity of the U.S. Corporate Tax System 
There is a general belief that prescriptive rules are easier and less 
costly to implement because they direct a specific outcome and do not 
require an assessment of particular facts to a given principle.  In fact, 
however, this argument loses force when the overall regulatory regime is 
highly complex.  Even though the treatment of a given transaction may 
be predetermined under a prescriptive rule, the taxpayer must still be 
 
credits from passive activities generally are limited to the tax allocable to the passive activities.  § 
469(g)(1). 
 84. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4T, 54 Fed. Reg. 20,527 (1989).  
 85. Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4, 57 Fed. Reg. 20,802, 20,803 (1992). 
 86. Notwithstanding the reduction of rules relating the definition of “activity,” the final 
regulations still contain one of the most complex and voluminous set of regulations in the Code.  
 87. Weisbach, supra note 17, at 867. 
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able to determine what that outcome is.  As discussed above, with the 
nearly 100,000 pages of existing Code and Treasury regulations that 
exist in the current tax system, the task of figuring out the tax 
consequences of a particular transaction can be more than daunting.  
This is particularly true as transactions become increasingly complex.  
Overlapping or overriding provisions may or may not be applicable, 
making the determination of the appropriate treatment of any given 
transaction potentially a timely and expensive endeavor.  Thus, even 
though a given rule, or set of rules, may prescribe a particular outcome, 
deciding which, if any, provision is appropriate to apply can require the 
same, or even more, work than a principles-based regime.88  
Accordingly, because of the highly intricate nature of the current U.S. 
corporate tax provisions, the assumption that compliance with 
prescriptive rules is less timely and expensive is not necessarily 
accurate. 
3.  Regulating Common and Fringe Transactions in an Evolving 
Marketplace 
One of the primary complaints against principles-based rules is that 
they are too ambiguous and do not provide enough predictability to the 
regulated entity.  Indeed, in the tax law, predictability of application and 
outcome is extremely important for transactions in which taxpayers 
frequently engage.  However, the assumption that predictability can be 
best provided by prescriptive rules can be compromised when tax 
policymakers are working to police complex transactions in a fast-
changing marketplace.  In these situations, principles may in fact provide 
better guidance than prescriptive rules. 
At a basic level, the tax system should enable taxpayers who 
engage in commonplace transactions to be relatively certain of the 
resulting tax costs ex ante.  Tax considerations often play a pivotal role 
in assessing whether or not it is advisable for a taxpayer to engage in a 
particular transaction.  The tax system would be impractical and 
unwieldy if the majority of transactions required subjective 
determinations to be made by the taxpayers and government.  
Accordingly, prescriptive rules, and the predictability they provide, are 
appropriate for regulating rudimentary transactions.  Indeed, there are 
existing simple prescriptive rules that are longstanding, work well, and 
 
 88. For example, just determining the proper allocation and apportionment of interest expense 
for purposes of calculating the foreign tax credit can be an extraordinarily grueling and time 
consuming process. 
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do not cause any significant changes in taxpayer behaviors, and these 
generally should not be replaced or overridden by broader principles.89  
As the level of intricacy and specialization of the transactions 
increase, however, and the marketplace in which taxpayers operate 
evolves, the assumptive predictability of prescriptive rules can be 
diminished.  Prescriptive rules can only be effective in so far as they 
adequately address the specific transaction at issue.  Thus, when trying 
to regulate behaviors in an environment that is undergoing constant 
change, principles-based rules may in fact provide better guidance than 
prescriptive rules.   
The pace of global innovation is so rapid that it is impossible for 
any jurisdiction to keep in lockstep with its development.  Accordingly, 
as transactions evolve and new products are developed, prescriptive 
rules tend to be either over- or under-inclusive, because it is impossible 
for the government to effectively anticipate every potential scenario that 
can be created.  As articulated by Kevin Dolan, “[a prescriptive]-based 
rule can be a rifle shot that hits only one piece of the logical target or hits 
the wrong target,” or “[a]lternatively, it can be a scattershot, hitting 
many wrong targets and causing collateral damage.”90  On the other 
hand, even if a particular transaction is not contemplated by the drafters 
of a principles-based regulation, because the underlying principle is 
directly articulated in the rule, the applicable principle will nevertheless 
govern the outcome.  In this way, principles-based rules have the 
advantage of being able to cover a broader range of situations.91  
Therefore, the less prescriptive a regulatory system is, the more easily it 
will be able to absorb various changes in the markets as they occur. 
Principles-based rules will increase the effectiveness of the U.S. tax 
system in a constantly evolving environment.  A principles-based system 
will be better equipped to deal with the economic transformation that has 
occurred as a result of globalization by enabling policymakers to build a 
platform upon which they can more effectively and efficiently 
administer tax policy.  Principles-based rules have the advantage of 
 
 89. See Weisbach, supra note 17, at 882-83. 
 90. Kevin Dolan, Foreign Tax Credit Generator Regs: The Purple People Eater Returns, 115 
TAX NOTES 1155 (June 18, 2007). 
 91. Kaplow, supra note 74, at 616: 
In the present legal system, it is usually believed that standards are easier to 
keep up-to-date.  The reason is that standards are given content in a definitive 
way only when they are applied to particular conduct.  Thus, a standard 
promulgated decades ago can be applied to conduct in the recent past using 
present understandings rather than those from an earlier era.   
Id. (citations omitted). 
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being able to cover a broader range of situations, and are thus more 
effective when trying to regulate behaviors in an environment that is 
undergoing constant changes.  In this sense, they may also provide 
MNCs with more guidance when dealing with novel issues.  Having a 
cohesive set of principles can enable the MNCs to more accurately 
predict the application of the law to their proposed transactions. 
4.  The Potential Exploitation of Loopholes and the Attractiveness 
of Uncertainty 
Certainty of application is often touted as the key advantage of 
prescriptive rules over principles-based rules.  From the government’s 
perspective, however, certainty may not be desirable when it is 
contending with rules that inevitably create loopholes that can be easily 
exploited by sophisticated MNCs and their advisors.  When the 
government is attempting to regulate transactions that fall into these gaps 
not anticipated by the original drafters, its chances for a government-
favorable outcome are greatly hampered without the presence of any 
overarching standard.  If the government tries to rely primarily on 
addressing these situations after the fact by layering prescriptive rules on 
top of prescriptive rules, then it will inevitably end up on the losing end 
of a reactive game of catch-up.   
With the plethora of derivative and entity forms currently available 
in taxpayers’ arsenals, it would be very unusual for a new product to 
come into the marketplace that is not at least tax-neutral or more likely 
tax-advantaged.  Tax benefits are typically a huge (and often primary) 
factor in the development of new structures and products.  Thus, the 
backstop of a principles-based rule would be preferable from the 
government’s perspective because even a miniscule change to the facts 
can change the outcome under a prescriptive rule,92 and if the bright-
lined requirements of a particular statute or regulation are met, then the 
government may have a much more difficult time sustaining a contrary 
position.  As noted by Daniel Shaviro, a key reason for using principles-
based rules is that the IRS can apply them “even if the government failed 
to anticipate a particular trick and state in advance that it does not work,” 
and “[t]here are simply too many fault lines in the existing income tax 
laws and too many clever people laboring behind closed doors to find 
 
 92. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 17, at 873 (discussing discontinuous nature of prescriptive 
rules). 
28
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 25 [2010], Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol25/iss1/1
HOLMES 3/15/2010  11:23 AM 
2010] DECONSTRUCTING THE RULES OF CORPORATE TAX 29 
new ways to exploit these fault lines for after-the-fact prospective 
responses to be adequate.”93 
The exploitation of loopholes can create significant social waste.  If 
the ability of the government to respond to gaps in the tax law is 
compromised, then “what was a potentially small loophole with 
relevance to only a few transactions,” inevitably becomes “a large 
loophole as enterprising tax advisors funnel money and clients through 
such gaps.”94  The better the tax advantage, the more ordinary the 
extraordinary transaction will become, creating even greater social 
inefficiencies and costs.95    
Accordingly, principles-based rules may better enable the United 
States to neutralize and minimize these distortions that can be created 
when tax considerations play an undue role in investment decisions, by 
introducing a level of what I will call “desirable uncertainty.”  That is, 
the level of unpredictability caused by the principles-based rule provides 
an attractive benefit to the government who is trying to prevent 
taxpayers from taking advantage of the fact that it is impossible for it to 
adequately predict the future actions of taxpayers.96 
Because taxpayers will always have the advantage of being able to 
structure into (or around) particular tax provisions that the government 
has set forth,97 it is important to consider the types of incentives or 
constraints a particular form of rule will provide to the taxpayer when 
they are at the crossroads of deciding whether or not to enter into a 
transaction.  In this regard, principles-based rules could be a leveling 
mechanism for a government with inadequate resources to regulate an 
entity with superior resources and the advantage of not having to act 
first.98  The blurry line created by a principle may introduce a level of 
 
 93. DANIEL SHAVIRO, CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: WHY THEY ARE 
A PROBLEM AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 23 (2004). 
 94. Logue, supra note 72, at 366. 
 95. Weisbach, supra note 17, at 869. 
 96. For example, Section 482 of the Code gives the IRS enormous discretion to decide 
whether taxes are being evaded or income is not being clearly reflected when policing transactions 
among commonly controlled entities.  I.R.C § 482 (2006).  As globalization has expanded the 
opportunities for MNCs to take aggressive positions with respect to their intercompany cross-border 
transactions, the IRS’s powers under Section 482 have become more important.  See, e.g., Aprill, 
supra note 78, at 26 (“[A]s multinational issues grew, so did the impact of section 482.”). 
 97. See Schizer, supra note 46, at 334-35 (“[S]helters (and, indeed, all aggressive planning) 
exploit poorly drafted statutes and regulations.  The relevant rules are capable of being read (albeit 
aggressively) to allow, for example, tax losses with no corresponding economic losses.  Drafters 
need to be more effective in anticipating this sort of misreading.”). 
 98. See generally id. at 331 (acknowledging that a contributing factor to aggressive tax 
planning is the imbalance of resources and experience between the taxpayers and the IRS auditors). 
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desirable uncertainty that can serve to restrain the taxpayers’ behavior.99  
As a result, even though a taxpayer may want to engage in a form of 
transaction not anticipated by the drafters, an overarching principles-
based rule could nonetheless cast a shadow under which the transaction 
will be structured.100  A principles-based rule is not as easy to step 
around as a neatly drawn prescriptive line in the sand.  In this way, 
principles-based rules can more effectively diminish a taxpayer’s ability 
to exploit gaps in the tax law. 
5.  Timely Regulatory Guidance 
A commitment to make up-to-date guidance readily available can 
also help mitigate the perceived disadvantages of principles-based rules.  
For example, once the IRS issues a revenue ruling with respect to a 
particular type of transaction, a prescriptive rule is established for that 
set of facts.101  Therefore, the level of uncertainty and cost of compliance 
with respect to that specific transaction are greatly reduced.  Even in the 
case of the issuance of less formal guidance that does not have any strict 
precedential value,102 such guidance will still help to establish 
 
 99. See, e.g., Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on the Effects of Principles- and Rules-
Based Standards 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 91, 99 (2003).  It is worthwhile to note that some data that 
shows that the aggressiveness of positions can sometimes increase with the imprecision of the 
relevant rule because responders are able to interpret the evidence more liberally.  Id. at 96-97.  
However, this latitude of ambiguity will cut the other way when the deterrents and penalties are 
sufficiently onerous such that the value of certainty becomes augmented.  Id. at 99. 
 100. While the increased flexibility of principles-based rules may more effectively eliminate 
the presence of tax loopholes and opportunities for tax arbitrage, in certain situations MNCs may 
actually prefer the flexibility that principles-based rules can provide.  The attitude of an entity 
towards the implementation of principles or prescriptive rules may very well depend, among other 
factors, on whether the underlying rule is intended to be permissive or restrictive.  Clearly, if a 
regulation is attempting to restrict or penalize the behavior of MNCs, they would likely prefer the 
specificity of a prescriptive rule because it would be easier to avoid its application.  On the other 
hand, if the rule permits the MNC to engage in a behavior that it deems favorable, it may prefer a 
rule that is principles-based because it would give the MNC the flexibility to comply with the rule in 
whatever way it deemed most efficient or otherwise desirable.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (2006). 
 101. Kaplow, supra note 74, at 577-78. 
 102. Strictly speaking, IRS administrative guidance such as chief counsel advice, private letter 
rulings and technical advice memoranda may not be used or cited as precedent.  I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) 
(2006).  Nevertheless, such materials are routinely cited to reveal statutory interpretation by the IRS 
as the agency charged with administering the revenue laws, and as evidence that a particular 
construction is compelled by the language of the statute.  Hanover Bank v. Comm’r, 369 U.S. 672, 
686-87 (1962); Estate of Bongard v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 95, 162 n.18 (2005); Woods Inv. Co. v. 
Comm’r, 85 T.C. 274, 281 n.15 (1985).  See also Dover Corp. v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 324, 341 n.12 
(2004) (“Private letter rulings may be cited to show the practice of the Commissioner.”); Estate of 
Cristofani v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 74, 84 n.5 (1991) (stating that private letter rulings are not 
precedential, but reveal the IRS’s interpretation of statute); AT&T Corp. v. United States, 62 Fed. 
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interpretive norms and make the application of the underlying principle 
more predictable.  Thus, in moving towards a more principles-based 
system, it would be extremely important for the IRS to supply consistent 
guidance interpreting the underlying principles.103  This would give the 
relevant principle more precision and predictability.  In such a case, a 
principles-based rule could have the benefit of more certainty with 
respect to the transactions on which the IRS or courts have provided 
guidance, while maintaining the advantage of being able to guide 
MNCs’ behavior on the implementation of novel transactions.  Of 
course, one drawback is that too much additional interpretative guidance 
for a particular principle can increase the complexity of the principle and 
thus diminish its benefits of simplicity.104  Also, the issuance of guidance 
creates additional administrative costs for the government and 
potentially incremental compliance costs for the taxpayer who must be 
able to discover and analyze these precedents.  Nevertheless, the 
issuance of targeted guidance to taxpayers can be a useful tool in 
enhancing the predictability of principles, a result often welcome by 
taxpayers. 
6.  High Level of Complexity Employed by the IRS and Courts 
When analyzing the relative advantages of prescriptive rules versus 
principles-based rules, it is important to take into account the level of 
detail actually used by the enforcers of the rules.105  In an era in which 
the judicially constructed economic substance/business purpose and 
step-transaction doctrines lurk in the background and are being pursued 
with invigorated zealousness by the government,106 for most structured 
 
Cl. 490, 496 (2004) (stating that technical advice memoranda are not precedential, but can be 
instructive). 
 103. Detailed examples in any implementing regulations could also have the same effect. 
 104. See Nelson, supra note 99, at 96. 
 105. Kaplow, supra note 74, at 565-66. 
 106. Courts may deny a tax benefit associated with a transaction that might otherwise arise on 
the basis that the taxpayer does not have a business purpose for entering into a transaction or that 
there is no economic effect of the transaction other than tax savings.  See generally Gregory v. 
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), aff’g, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).  The step transaction doctrine 
allows the IRS to disregard a particular step in a transaction only if a taxpayer included the step for 
no purpose other than tax avoidance.  See, e.g., Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm’r, 251 F.3d 
210, 213 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  This extra-statutory use of common law doctrines has been criticized by 
several scholars as being unnecessary in a regime with highly articulated standards.  See, e.g., 
Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859 (1982); 
John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit:  A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 
1501 (1997); Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, “Purposivism,” and the Interpretation of Tax 
Statutes, 51 TAX. L. REV. 677 (1996); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations 
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transactions no matter how seemingly straight-forward the prescriptive 
rule might be, the analysis nonetheless becomes rather muddled.  The 
recent expansion of Circular 230 has further heightened the attention 
paid to these issues because tax advisors can no longer provide penalty-
protection opinions by assuming that their client has a business purpose 
or that the transaction has an economic effect other than the creation of 
tax benefits.107 
Thus, complaints about uncertainty can have much less relevance 
when dealing with the regulation of intricately engineered transactions.  
Even when MNCs and their advisors are able to squarely structure into a 
gap in the regulatory system, much time and discussion is still devoted 
to examining the business purpose/economic substance, step transaction, 
conduit and/or any other relevant anti-abuse doctrines.  For example, 
when attempting to express concerns about ongoing foreign tax credit 
abuses, the IRS stated that although regulations regarding the particular 
abuse at issue would not be pursued, that it would continue to challenge 
transactions generating “inappropriate” foreign tax credit results under 
“the substance over form doctrine, the step transaction doctrine, debt-
equity principles, Section 269, the partnership anti-abuse rules of 
§1.701-2, and the substantial economic effect rules of  §1.704-1.”108  
Therefore, in addition to the actual foreign tax rules and regulations 
under Section 901 that MNCs and tax advisors must contend with, they 
must also examine the potential application of these other provisions and 
doctrines as well. 
This is not to say that all, or even most, structured transactions are 
in fact abusive or lacking a business purpose.  However, because these 
kinds of transactions can involve the shifting of income, arbitrage, the 
exploitation of a loophole and/or achieve results clearly not anticipated 
by the drafters, such as the double non-taxation of income, there is 
usually a heightened concern by taxpayers and their advisors that the 
IRS may attempt to use all of the weapons available in its arsenal to 
 
of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986).  However, the judicial use of these extra-
statutory standards is well established and endorsed by Supreme Court decisions.  See, e.g., 
Gregory, 293 U.S. 465. 
 107. Treas. Dept. Circ. No. 230 § 10.35(c)(1)(ii) (Sept. 26, 2007) (“[I]t is unreasonable to 
assume that a transaction has a business purpose or that a transaction is potentially profitable apart 
from tax benefits.”).  Circular number 230, which governs the standards of professional practice for 
tax advisors, was recently modified to expand the gatekeeping role of advisors with respect to 
aggressive tax planning.  T.D. 9165, 70 Fed. Reg. 75839-01 (Dec. 20, 2004) (amended by T.D. 
9201, 70 Fed. Reg. 28824-01 (May 19, 2005) and T.D. 9359, 72 Fed. Reg. 54540-01 (Sep. 26, 
2007)). 
 108. Notice 2004-19, 2004-1 C.B. 606 (withdrawing Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334). 
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attack the transaction, including the anti-abuse doctrines.  Thus, before 
executing these transactions, taxpayers are likely to seek opinions from 
their tax advisors analyzing whether the IRS may be successful in any 
attempts to disregard or recast their transactions.  Accordingly, any 
incremental time spent examining whether a transaction satisfies the 
underlying principle of a particular statutory rule may not be as 
relatively significant because it will only be one additional subjective 
factor to consider. 
7.  Interaction of the U.S. Tax Rules with Tax Rules of Other 
Jurisdictions 
The perception regarding the advantages and disadvantages of 
prescriptive and principles-based rulemaking can also be affected when 
more than one country’s rules apply to a single transaction.  Today 
cross-border transactions are increasingly prevalent, and the interaction 
of the laws of the relevant jurisdictions can often produce unanticipated 
results and create opportunities for tax arbitrage.  Now, more than ever, 
large MNCs are engaging in these highly structured deals that can result 
in double non-taxation.109  In these transactions, MNCs are able to attain 
significant tax benefits by exploiting differences or inconsistencies in 
two or more jurisdictions’ tax laws.  For example, an opportunity for tax 
arbitrage can exist when the same items of deduction and income, 
entities or instruments are treated or classified differently by two or 
more jurisdictions.110  Such differences can result in significant tax 
benefits, such as multiple deductions or credits or deductions with no 
offsetting inclusion.   
At a fundamental level, arbitrage itself may not necessarily be 
abusive, as it can be the natural result of a global economy that contains 
 
 109. See Paulus Merks, Categorizing Corporate Cross-Border Tax Planning Techniques, 44 
TAX NOTES INT’L 55, 56 (Oct. 2, 2006) (“[I]nstances when particular income is not taxed at all are 
becoming increasingly frequent.”). 
 110. As a simple example, assume that a U.S.-based MNC issues an original issue discount 
(“OID”) instrument to non-related investors in Country A.  Assume further that Country A does not 
have OID rules, so that a zero coupon bond allows a Country A holder to defer the inclusion of 
interest income, while the U.S.-based MNC is allowed to deduct the interest on an economic accrual 
basis under the U.S. tax rules.  Because there are no current inclusions for the Country A investors, 
the OID instruments can be issued at a lower rate of interest than if they were issued to U.S. 
investors (who would have to currently include the accrued interest in income).  For more examples 
of cross-border arbitrage transactions, see Mark Silverman & Philip R. West, Law Firm Comments 
on Leveraged Foreign Investment, Cross-Border Arbitrage Transaction Issues, 2006 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 148-28 (July 31, 2006); Yaron Z. Reich, International Arbitrage Transactions Involving 
Creditable Taxes, TAXES, Mar. 2007, at 53. 
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disparate tax systems.111  It has long been argued that taxpayers are free 
to manage their affairs in a way that minimizes their tax liability.112  
However, many view this exploitation by MNCs of differences in tax 
systems as inappropriate or unfair and the highly engineered and 
artificial structures that produce some of these arbitrage spreads can 
have significant economic consequences in one or both of the affected 
jurisdictions.   
At its core, cross-border tax arbitrage requires inconsistencies 
between the tax laws of two or more jurisdictions.  The prevalence of 
these transactions is aided by the predominance of bright-lined 
prescriptive rules.  The same way that sophisticated MNCs and their 
advisors are able to structure around loopholes in the U.S. tax system, 
they are equally adept at structuring cross-border transactions that take 
advantage of the differences between the disparate tax rules of two 
jurisdictions.  However, the more demarcated the rules in the tax 
systems are, the more easily the mismatch between dissimilar rules can 
be identified and exploited.113  On the other hand, principles-based rules 
 
 111. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, U.S., U.K. Officials Discuss Cross-Border Tax Planning, 2005 
TAX NOTES TODAY 233-4 (Dec. 6, 2005); Mark J. Silverman & Philip West, Law Firm Comments 
on Leveraged Foreign Investment, Cross Border Arbitrage Transaction Issues 2006 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 148-28, 6-7 (July 31, 2006):  
[W]e think that there is no serious debate about the fundamental proposition 
that, absent a law or regulation to the contrary, a tax result is not rendered 
inapplicable solely because a different or inconsistent result is produced for 
the same transaction under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction . . . [or] that an 
enhanced economic return or the prospect of a lower cost of funding before 
consideration of U.S. taxes constitutes a valid business purpose for adopting a 
particular structure for a given investment.  Taken together, these two 
propositions suggest that, if a U.S. taxpayer is able to obtain capital through a 
structure at a lower cost of funds than would be paid without that structure, 
the tax consequences that otherwise result are not rendered inapplicable, even 
if the structure yields inconsistent tax results in the U.S. and another 
jurisdiction . . . .    
Id.  Even Hal Hicks, Treasury international tax counsel, stated that there is nothing inherently wrong 
with cross-border tax arbitrage because it is a natural byproduct of the global economy interacting 
with disparate tax systems and it is hard to delineate what is evil from what is acceptable.  Sheryl 
Stratton, Tax Arbitrage Not Inherently “Evil,” Treasury Official Says, 2006 TAX NOTES TODAY 9-3 
(Jan. 13, 2006). 
 112. Judge L. Hand argued:  
[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its 
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one chooses, to 
evade, taxation.  Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as 
low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the 
Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes. . . .   
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 113. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 17, at 874. 
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can make the identification of incongruous rules more difficult.  The 
potential gaps between lines that are blurry can be much harder to 
pinpoint.   
In addition, well-enunciated principles can potentially ease the 
ability of the United States to coordinate its tax rules and policies with 
those of other countries so as to prevent the unintended results of tax 
arbitrage transactions.  International collaboration with peer jurisdictions 
can help to produce more harmonized rules among cooperators.114  
Coordinating principles of the involved national regulators would help 
reduce the opportunities for arbitrage transactions between parties in the 
cooperating jurisdictions and help to broaden the United States’ political 
reach beyond its borders.  Globalization, in a very real sense, limits a 
nation’s sovereign ability to impose any particular policy on an MNC, 
for example, when that MNC is highly elastic and can easily “opt out” of 
a regulatory scheme or rule it does not like.  By coordinating with other 
jurisdictions, however, the United States can help influence the policies 
of other jurisdictions.115  In essence, the larger the pool of global 
cooperators, the larger the reach of our political power and the less able 
the MNCs will be able to opt out of a particular policy.116   
To that end, it is easier to coordinate and agree to overarching 
principles with other jurisdictions than it is to attempt to perfectly align 
competing (or even non-competing) sets of narrowly tailored 
prescriptive rules.117  If two taxing jurisdictions are trying to pervasively 
eliminate opportunities for arbitrage, it is necessary to be able to first 
identify where the underlying policy gaps exist.  However, without the 
presence of clearly articulated principles, that task can be very difficult, 
or even impossible.  The complexity generated by prescriptive rules can 
 
 114. Former IRS Commissioner Mark Everson stated that “[m]any of [his] counterparts in the 
international tax community have expressed the need for greater cooperation to fight the 
proliferation of abusive tax practices.”  Internal Revenue Serv., Everson Chairs International Tax 
Forum, Underscores Enforcement, 2006 TAX NOTES TODAY 148-10 (Aug. 1, 2006).   
 115. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Some Observations Concerning Multi-Jurisdictional Tax 
Competition (NYU Center for L. & Bus., Working Paper No. CLB-00-001, 2000). 
 116. Insop Pak, International Finance and State Sovereignty: Global Governance in the 
International Tax Regime, 10 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 165, 197 (2004).  
 117. Coordination would not necessarily require homogenization.  Complete cooperation is not 
often likely to occur because independent countries must be expected to follow their own interests 
in developing rules of taxation that best suit them.  See, e.g., H. David Rosenbloom, Speech at the 
59th Annual Federal Tax Conference of the University of Chicago Law School (Nov. 11, 2006); see 
also H. David Rosenbloom, Cross-Border Arbitrage: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly, 85 TAXES 
115 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012888.  It is also not 
necessarily the case that any compromises away from unilateralism will decrease domestic 
efficiency and undermine domestic policy concerns, because in many instances the laws did not, ab 
initio, take into account any international impact or result that was intended by the lawmakers.  
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thus significantly impair the ability of the United States to effectively 
cooperate with other jurisdictions.118 
C. The Proper Balance of Principles and Prescription in U.S. Corporate 
Tax Law 
As the preceding analysis shows, the utility of principles-based 
versus prescriptive rules is not strictly a black-and-white determination.  
The relative advantages of, and therefore weight given to, either a 
prescriptive or principles-based rulemaking approach can depend on any 
number of important factors.  In particular, as it relates to the corporate 
tax system, the preceding examination of the pertinent considerations 
reveals that:  (i) the use of more principles-based rules should help 
simplify the tax laws; (ii) the use of prescriptive rules in the tax law may 
not be easier and less costly to apply because of the underlying inherent 
complexity of the U.S. tax system; (iii) the certainty of prescriptive rules 
is most necessary and achievable when regulating straight-forward, 
commonplace transactions; (iv) principles-based rules can provide more 
guidance to novel transactions and more effectively mitigate the 
emergence and exploitation of tax loopholes; (v) if targeted, up-to-date 
guidance is being articulated with respect to commonplace transactions, 
a principles-based rule can quickly adopt some of the positive 
characteristics associated with prescriptive rules (e.g., certainty of 
outcome), while maintaining the advantages of having a regulatory 
safety net; (vi) when dealing with highly structured transactions, because 
of the myriad of anti-abuse doctrines that can apply, the application of a 
substantive principles-based rule may only add accretive complexity to 
the analysis when compared to applying a prescriptive rule; and (vii) the 
development and implementation of more principles-based rules can 
facilitate the ability of the United States to cooperate with its 
international counterparts to address issues such as the proliferation of 
abusive cross-border arbitrage transactions. 
Accordingly, taking into account these determinations as a whole, 
and the lessons learned from prior concerted attempts at principles-based 
 
 118. For example, a few years ago, the United States had significant issues negotiating with the 
OECD about the model income tax treaty because the United States, having adopted the check-the-
box regulations, had to contend with the ensuing plethora of hybrids.  See Article 23 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention (2003); Lee A. Sheppard, U.S. Sponsored Double Non-Taxation, 110 TAX 
NOTES 196 (Jan. 16, 2006).  Even though the United States eventually “persuaded” the OECD to 
view hybrids in way that would benefit foreign investment in the United States, it did so with great 
difficulty, and the resulting effects have enabled undesirable double non-taxation that has prompted 
even more debate.  Id.  
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rulemaking, discussed below, I believe that an optimal corporate tax 
system should contain a tailored combination of both principles-based 
and prescriptive guidance.  An ideal construct would continue to rely on 
prescriptive rules to govern straightforward, commonplace transactions.  
However, in other areas, principles-based rules should significantly 
supplement, and in some instances supplant, these prescriptive rules in 
order to both simplify the tax law and serve as a backstop to the 
prescriptive rules to prevent the emergence of loopholes. 
1.  Prior Attempts at Principles-Based Rules in the Tax Law: Anti-
Abuse Provisions 
A move away from strict prescriptive rules previously arose in the 
U.S. tax law in response to the rise of tax shelter development and 
marketing efforts by major accounting and other tax advisory firms in 
the 1990s.  These tax shelter products typically involved hyper-technical 
readings of the Code and Treasury regulations.  U.S. tax policymakers 
responded by putting in place any number of quasi principles-based 
rules, mostly in the form of anti-abuse provisions, in order to combat 
taxpayers’ increasing manipulation of the literal language of the law.119  
The effective use of these anti-abuse rules against tax shelters, however, 
has been compromised by their infrequent and imbalanced application.  
In part, this is because the IRS is frequently hampered by issues of 
uncertainty and invalidity, often inspired by its own vague and 
overbroad drafting.  
Weisbach suggested two general methods for combating the rise of 
tax shelters:  (i) close loopholes once they are determined to be the 
source of exploitation, and (ii) use broad standards, such as anti-abuse 
rules, to deny tax benefits in certain loosely specified classes of 
transactions to prevent exploitations from occurring in the first place.120  
One of the primary arguments against (ii) is that broad standards tend to 
produce uncertainty for taxpayers who are trying to structure non-
abusive, ordinary course transactions.121  This seems to be the block 
upon which the IRS tends to stumble.122  For example, the proposed anti-
 
 119. For a full discussion of these regulatory and judicial efforts to address tax shelters, see 
generally, Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver 
Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939 (2005); Aprill, supra note 78; Lawrence Zelenak, Codifying Anti-
Avoidance Doctrines and Controlling Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 177 (2001). 
 120. David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 247 (2002). 
 121. Id. 
 122. The U.K. government in 2005 passed anti-cross-border arbitrage legislation which 
targeted the use of hybrid entities and instruments in double-dip structures in which a tax deduction 
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abuse rules in the check-the-box regulations, a regime widely 
acknowledged as being directly responsible for a great many of the 
existing arbitrage structures, was withdrawn in 2003 due to concerns of 
uncertainty.123  In its withdrawal notice, the IRS stated that “[m]ost 
commentators criticized the approach adopted in the proposed 
regulations as overly broad and expressed concern that [they] would 
mitigate the increased certainty promoted by the entity classification 
regulations. . . .”124   
I agree with Weisbach, however, that notwithstanding any 
uncertainty concerns “[prescriptive] rules-based responses to shelters 
tend to make the law more complicated” and are less effective.125  The 
problem frequently encountered with the principle-driven rules to date is 
that they often suffer from overly broad drafting.  I believe 
implementing more precise and focused principles into the Code and 
regulations can abate this issue.  For instance, rather than have vague, 
broad-based anti-abuse standards that are intended to cover an expansive 
spectrum of transactions that are already subject to a bevy of other 
rules,126 it would be more effective to have a more tailored 
 
is achieved in the United Kingdom and in another jurisdiction on the same matter or payment.  
Avoidance Involving Tax Arbitrage, Finance (no.2) Act 2005, §§ 24-31.  The United Kingdom’s tax 
authority, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”), has clarified that the provisions of this 
anti-abuse rule will not apply if the tax benefit could have been otherwise achieved absent the 
structure in question.  See Andy Newsome et al., New U.K. Finance Provisions Bring Uncertainty, 
16 INT’L TAX REV. 56 (Mergers & Acquisitions 2005).  The IRS and Treasury balked at the United 
Kingdom’s broad stroke attempts to curb tax arbitrage abuses, raising concerns that the breadth of 
the rules would unduly damper cross-border transactions entered into by U.S. and U.K. MNCs that 
were “legitimately” structured to minimize their tax burdens.  Robert Goulder, Treasury Official 
Questions U.K. Antiavoidance Approach, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 98-7 (May 20, 2005). 
 123. Notice 2003-46, 2003-2 C.B. 53, announced that the IRS would withdraw former Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(h), 64 Fed. Reg. 66691 (1992).  That former regulation was withdrawn by 
68 Fed. Reg. 60,305 (Oct. 22, 2003) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301), and Announcement 2003-
78, 2003-2 C.B. 1172. 
 124. Notice 2003-46, 2003-2 C.B. 53.  The IRS did say that it would “continue to pursue the 
application of other principles of existing law (such as the substance over form doctrine) to 
determine the proper tax consequences in such cases.”  Id.  In addition, opponents of the proposed 
partnership anti-abuse regulations argued that “they are so broadly and vaguely worded, and the 
examples are so limited, that it is almost impossible to determine what transactions will be 
covered.”  Richard M. Lipton, Controversial Partnership Anti-Abuse Prop. Regs. Raise Many 
Questions, 81 J. TAX’N 68 (Aug. 1994). 
 125. Weisbach, supra note 120, at 247. 
 126. The IRS has anti-abuse provisions that are intended to apply to an entire set of provisions 
in the tax law.  For example, under Treasury regulation Section 1.446-3(g)(1), the IRS can 
recharacterize all or part of a transaction (or series of transactions) if the effect of the transaction (or 
series of transactions) is to avoid the application of the notional principal contract regulations.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(g)(1) (1993, as corrected at T.D. 8491, 59 Fed. Reg. 9411, Feb. 28, 1994; 
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implementation of principles, such as in the form of “catch-all” 
provisions.127 
In other areas, such as with respect to the partnership anti-abuse 
rule, attempts to effectively administer the principled regulations also 
have been dampened or overshadowed by underlying concerns that the 
rule is invalid because it exceeds the IRS’s regulatory authority given by 
Congress.128  The Partnership Committee of the American Bar 
Association Section on Taxation argued that the partnership anti-abuse 
rules are invalid on the basis that they do “not interpret the language or 
meaning of Section 701 under which it is being promulgated.”129  Most 
likely because of the IRS’s cognizance of its shaky regulatory ground, 
the Treasury continues to require a field agent to receive approval from 
the National Office before asserting the partnership anti-abuse 
 
T.D. 8554, 59 Fed. Reg. 36358, July 18, 1994).  See also the broad partnership anti-abuse rules 
discussed below. 
 127. For example, under the notional principal contract regulations, the term “termination 
payment” includes (i) a payment made between the original parties to the contract (an 
extinguishment), (ii) a payment made between one party to the contract and a third party (an 
assignment), and (iii) any gain or loss realized on the exchange of one notional principal contract for 
another.  Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(h)(1).  However, as a “catch-all” provision, the regulations provide 
that even in the absence of an actual termination payment, that any other economic benefit that is 
given or received by a taxpayer in lieu of a termination payment is treated as a termination payment.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(h)(4)(ii). 
 128. In Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 443 (2005), the taxpayers asked the 
court to invalidate the partnership anti-abuse regulation on the grounds that it was inconsistent with 
judicial precedent, contrary to statute, and unduly vague.  Id. at 447.  See also Shop Talk, Will the 
Court of Federal Claims Invalidate the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule?, 102 J. TAX’N 379 (June 
2005); Comments to IRS from Sheldon I. Banoff, Partnership Antiabuse Regs Should Be 
Rescinded, Banoff Asserts, 63 TAX NOTES 1256 (June 6, 1994); Comments to IRS from Sheldon I. 
Fink, Louis S. Freeman, Richard M. Lipton, and Thomas M. Stephens, Partnership Antiabuse Reg 
will have ‘Chilling Effect’ on Legitimate Transactions, Attorneys Say, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 115-
16 (June 15, 1994).  Cf. RLC Indus. Co. v. Comm’r, 58 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1995) (the court 
invalidated a timber-depletion anti-abuse rule in Treas. Reg. § 1.611-3(d)); Stephenson Trust v. 
Comm’r, 81 T.C. 283 (1983) (finding that the IRS invalidly inserted an anti-abuse rule (neither 
contained in the statute nor contemplated by Congress) relating to an entire portion of the Code 
(subchapter J)).  Lack of statutory authority is also mentioned in the foreign tax credit separation 
structure regulations.  Definition of Taxpayer for Purposes of 901 and Related Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 
44,240 (proposed Aug. 4, 2006) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).  Several bills have been proposed 
which would give explicit prescriptive authority to the IRS to address separation structures.  See, 
e.g., To offset the costs of defense spending in the supplemental appropriation, S. Amdt. 3715, § 
8112 (Apr. 2006) to Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on 
Terror, and Hurricane Katrina, H.R. 4939, 109th Cong. (2006).  Hicks, however, has stated that it 
does not see this legislation as any indication that the Treasury presently lacks the authority to 
rewrite the technical taxpayer rule, but rather is mere “confirmation to round out [their] authority.”  
Lee A. Sheppard, Offshore Investments: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 108 TAX NOTES 171 (July 11, 2005). 
 129. William H. Caudill, ABA Tax Section Members Say Anitabuse Rule is Not a Valid 
Exercise of IRS Authority, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 146-50 (July 1, 1994). 
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regulations.130  This problem of attacks on grounds of invalidity would 
be lessened where the underlying principles were clearly enunciated in 
the Code provision itself because Congress’ objectives would be made 
clear. 
Thus, although these existing principles-based anti-abuse 
provisions can be somewhat useful to the IRS as currently constructed 
and applied, they often fall short of effectuating their goals of deterring 
MNCs from engaging in highly structured transactions that take 
advantage of gaps in the tax law, and suffer from often legitimate attacks 
of over-breadth and invalidity.131  However, rather than merely adding 
more anti-abuse rules, I am proposing a more focused and systematic use 
of principles in the actual Code and Treasury regulations. 
2.  Proposed Use of Principles-Based Tax Rules 
Taking into account the problems with the existing uses of 
principles-based rules and the prior examination of the various factors 
that can impact the effects of principles in the tax law, I believe that 
principles can be most useful in corporate tax law when one or both of 
the following characteristics are present: (i) the line drawn by the 
prescriptive rule relates to a change in form only, and not in behavior or 
economic consequences of the taxpayer, and the distinctions made by 
the rule create significant differences in the potential tax liability of the 
taxpayer; and (ii) subtle changes to, or evolutions of, the form of the 
targeted transaction can easily avoid application of the law.132  In 
addition, principles-based rules can serve as effective stopgap measures 
for prescriptive rules, particularly when there is a clear underlying 
principle intended to be implemented by Congress or Treasury. 
 
 130. Announcement 94-87, 1994-27 I.R.B. 124 (1994).  In total, 140 requests were made 
within the IRS between 2003 and 2007 to apply the partnership anti-abuse regulation, and all but 
twelve were approved.  Id.  In March of 2007, the National Office granted blanket approval for 
agents to use the regulation in the case of seven specific transactions.  IRS Gives Agents Blanket 
Authority to Apply Partnership Anti-Abuse Reg, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 51-5 (Mar. 14, 2007).  
 131. Congress has grappled on at least four occasions with the codification of an “economic 
substance” standard, which would be a broad-based standard that would apply to all transactions, 
and, in each instance, could reach no conclusion.  CARE Act, S. 476, 108th Cong. § 701 (2003); 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, S. 1054, 108th Cong. § 301 (2003); Taxpayer 
Accountability Act, H.R. 1555, 108th Cong. § 101 (2003); The Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and 
Horticulture Act of 2007; S. Rep. No. 110-206, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 25, 2007). 
 132. Cf. David A. Weisbach, Corporate Tax Avoidance (John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ., 
Working Program No. 202, at 14, 2004) (“Standards [] should apply when the rules (or the drafters) 
fail to anticipate a rare transaction and when mis-taxation of the transaction would lead to the 
problem of a proliferation of the mis-taxed transactions.”). 
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First, the implementation of principles-based rules may be 
appropriate when the line drawn by the prescriptive rule relates merely 
to a change in form only, and the potential changes in tax liability to the 
taxpayer as a result of these changes are significant.133  In light of the 
extreme elasticity of most MNCs, providing taxpayers with clear options 
that do not result in any substantive effects to their economics or 
business structure but provide them with varying tax consequences, only 
gives them a greater number of options when structuring transactions.  
Thus, when MNCs can effectively decide to opt-in or opt-out of a 
particular tax treatment with no significant accompanying real-life 
consequences, it just engenders frictionless tax planning.  The incentives 
for MNCs to capitalize on these options are only magnified when these 
changes in form can create large changes in tax liability.  In these 
situations, principles-based rules could be helpful in making the 
distinctions between alternatives more substantive than procedural in 
order to ensure that taxes are not motivating otherwise non-economical 
transactions.  Alternatively, when differences in tax treatment are 
accompanied by real behavioral or economic consequences, taxpayers 
are less likely to change their structures solely for tax-motivated 
reasons.134  Furthermore, if the difference in tax treatment is not 
meaningful, then MNCs are less likely to spend the time and resources 
necessary to manipulate the most economically efficient form of the 
transaction (from a purely business perspective). 
An example of this is the U.S. residence rules.  The U.S. tax 
treatment of a corporation depends greatly on whether the ultimate or 
“top-tier” parent is incorporated in the United States.  The stakes of this 
determination can be quite high.  A U.S. resident is taxed on its 
worldwide income.  In contrast, a foreign corporation is only taxed in the 
United States on its income that is derived from U.S. sources.  The 
current U.S. residence rules base the determination solely on the place of 
organization.  Accordingly, a corporation is treated as domestic if it is 
created or organized in the United States, and all other corporations are 
treated as foreign.135  Thus, the status of a corporation as domestic or 
 
 133. Cf. Weisbach, supra note 17, at 882-83 (observing that prescriptive rules work well, 
“particularly where avoiding the rule requires real change in behavior rather than just a change in 
form.”). 
 134. For example, differences in treatment can create real “frictions” that the taxpayer must 
take into account.  See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1312 (2001) (providing a detailed analysis of when “frictions,” or constraints on 
tax planning other than tax law, such as transaction costs, financial accounting, regulatory treatment 
credit risk, etc. may adequately curtail wasteful tax planning).    
 135. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2006). 
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foreign is purely elective in most cases.  In this regard, “[t]he present-
law test of determining corporate residency based solely on where the 
company is incorporated is artificial, and allows certain foreign 
corporations that are economically similar or identical to U.S. 
corporations to avoid being taxed like U.S. corporations.”136  This 
problem was made evident with the flurry of corporate inversion 
transactions, where merely the place of incorporation, but not activities 
of the MNCs, changed.  A more principled approach could base 
residence on the corporation’s primary place of management and 
control, which could take into account other factors that affect a 
corporation’s substantive residence, including the location of the 
corporation’s management activities, employees, shareholders, business 
assets, operations and revenue sources.137  This would provide a more 
meaningful standard and could reduce the avoidance of tax by 
corporations who are effectively managed in the United States, 
notwithstanding their parent’s foreign address.138   
In addition, the use of principles-based rules may be more 
appropriate when subtle changes to, or evolutions of, the form of the 
targeted transaction can easily avoid the application of the law.  When 
the number of potential iterations of a particular transactional form is 
extremely high, it is not productive to use a prescriptive rule, the 
efficacy of which depends on it being able to determine the tax treatment 
of a specific transaction ex ante.  In dealing with derivative transactions, 
tax policymakers seem to be more aware of this issue.  As an example, 
for purposes of qualifying for the dividends-received deduction, a 
taxpayer’s holding period is reduced for periods when it holds offsetting 
positions that reduce its risk of loss on the underlying stock.139  In order 
to determine when the holding period has been reduced, the statute lists 
several concrete, prescriptive examples (i.e., being the grantor of a call 
 
 136. JOINT COMMITTEE OF TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX 
EXPENDITURES, JCS-02-05, 179 (Jan. 27, 2005).   
 137. Id.  This approach is already used by some taxing jurisdictions, including the United 
Kingdom and Canada.  Reuvan S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Reform in the (Multi)National Interest, 2009 
TAX NOTES TODAY 141-16 (July 27, 2009); S. Foreign Relations Comm., Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Issues Report on Canada Tax Treaty Protocol, 2008 TAX NOTES TODAY 182-45 (Sept. 
17, 2008).  
 138. Similarly, many hedge funds use these residency rules to be structured in a way that 
reduces or eliminates the tax to U.S. investors.  See Sheppard, supra note 128.  They are able to 
form partnerships in traditional tax haven jurisdictions, even though they are effectively run out of 
the United Sates, because the partnership residence rules, like the corporate residence rules, use 
place of organization rather than place of management or control.  Id.  
 139. IRC § 246(c)(4) (2006). 
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option or having a short sale open with respect to the stock).140  
Congress, however, was aware that any number of other derivative 
structures could be created that also have the effect of reducing a 
taxpayer’s risk of loss and did not endeavor to enumerate them.  Instead, 
it included a principles-based catch-all category, which provides that the 
holding period will also be tolled if “a taxpayer has diminished his risk 
of loss by holding one or more other positions with respect to 
substantially similar or related property.”141  Accordingly, a taxpayer, 
which otherwise has a high level of flexibility in structuring its hedging 
transactions, is nevertheless constrained by this overarching principle 
(i.e., they cannot diminish their risk of loss). 
Many other areas of corporate tax law suffer from similar problems, 
but tax lawmakers fail to take a similar approach.  With the availability 
of the check-the-box regime, sophisticated derivatives and a growing 
level of mobile assets, MNCs, in a sense, have a limitless number of 
structures they can create to circumvent or exploit the corporate tax 
provisions.142  There are many areas of the corporate tax regime where 
because of the intricacies and under-inclusiveness of the existing 
prescriptive provisions,143 mere subtle changes can allow the taxpayer to 
alter their tax treatment, for example by avoiding the application of an 
undesirable rule.144  The introduction of more principles would make this 
type of avoidance more difficult. 
Furthermore, because these are often the provisions where the 
proliferation of detail is highest, they should also be the areas in which 
the benefits of simplification are most profound (e.g., the foreign tax 
credit rules).  These provisions are often very complex because the IRS 
is trying to engage in the impossible task of trying to anticipate all of the 
potential structures that can be developed by taxpayers and their 
 
 140. IRC § 246(c)(4)(A) (2006). 
 141. I.R.C. § 246(c)(4)(C) (2006).  Under the implementing regulations, a taxpayer is 
considered to diminish its risk of loss on its stock by holding positions with respect to substantially 
similar or related property if changes in the fair market values of the stock and the positions are 
reasonably expected to vary inversely.  Treas. Reg. § 1.246-5(b)(2) (1995). 
 142. See, e.g., Erika W. Nijenhuis, NYSBA Report on Certain Administration International Tax 
Proposals, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 232-75 (Dec. 4, 2009) (discussing failed attempts to stop a 
number of abuses involving the check-the-box rules); Michael J. McIntyre, A Program for 
International Tax Reform, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 34-46 (Jan. 12, 2009) (“The indefensible 
check-the-box rules need to be revised to prevent widespread abuses, including the avoidance of 
many antiavoidance rules and the taking of  inconsistent tax positions in different countries); Lee A. 
Sheppard, Behind the Eight Ball on Check-the-Box Abuses, 101 TAX NOTES 437 (Oct. 27, 2003) 
(noting that the check-the-box rules facilitate the process of abuse). 
 143. See, e.g., the discussion in Part III.C.3. 
 144. See supra note 140 and text. 
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advisors.  In addition, abuses of these rules often result in the addition of 
even more rules, as tax policymakers attempt to “fix” the law by piling 
on yet more prescriptive provisions.  Accordingly, not only could the use 
of principles-based rules in these circumstances help the IRS more 
adequately regulate the future generation of existing transactions, but 
they could also result in significant simplification.  An example of the 
type of regulatory provision where principles-based rules could be more 
ideal is contained in the case study of recently promulgated foreign tax 
credit generator regulations in Part IV.C.3 below. 
Finally, I believe that it is useful for the drafters of the Code and 
Treasury regulations to include the underlying principle in the actual tax 
provision, where appropriate,145 rather than not articulating them at all or 
just referencing them in the accompanying legislative history of the 
Code or preamble to the Treasury regulation, where their utility can be 
rather limited.146  Having direct statements of the applicable principles in 
the governing provision will help to ensure that any new structures, or 
derivations of old structures, can be covered by the applicable principle.  
Not only could this expand the reach of the existing laws, but it could 
also reduce the necessity for regulators to supplement the existing rules 
when new transactional structures inevitably arise.   
There are any number of commonly understood general principles 
in the corporate tax regime area that are found nowhere in the actual 
operative provisions.  For example, it is often asserted that foreign tax 
credits should not be separated from the related foreign income on which 
the tax is imposed.147  Although many provisions in the Code and 
regulations try to effectuate this underlying principle, it is not directly 
articulated in the law and, accordingly, can often be violated by mere 
application of the prescriptive rules, particularly with the use of hybrid 
entities and instruments.148  In that sense, prescriptive rules falter relative 
 
 145. It is understood that some rules are implemented merely for administrative convenience 
and there may be no broader principle at play. 
 146. See, e.g., Preamble, Regulations Enabling Elections for Certain Transactions Under 
Section 336(e), Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 Fed. Reg.  49,965 (Aug. 25, 2008); Preamble, 
Transfers by Domestic Corporations That Are Subject to Section 367(a)(5), Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,278 (Aug. 20, 2008). 
 147. For example, IRS and Treasury announced that, notwithstanding the withdrawal of Notice 
98-5, they would continue to scrutinize transactions that generate inappropriate foreign tax credit 
results, such as transactions that “effectively separate foreign taxes from the related foreign income, 
including transactions that create a mismatch in the timing of recognition for U.S. tax purposes of 
foreign taxes and the related foreign income.”  See, e.g., Notice 2004-19, 2004-1 C.B. 606 
(withdrawing Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334). 
 148. Indeed, in order to combat the rising prevalence of foreign tax credit separation structures, 
in August of 2006, Treasury and the IRS issued proposed regulations attempting to restrict 
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to the comparable principles-based rule “when a particular application of 
a rule generates a result divergent from that which would have been 
generated by direct application of the rule’s justification.”149  Because it 
is impossible for legislators and regulators to fully anticipate the 
potential activities of the taxpayers, it is less likely that the intended 
original purpose of a provision will be realized when only the existing 
prescriptive rule is applicable to a given factual situation.   
In addition, when the underlying justification and purpose of a rule 
is not easily deduced or can only be found in the legislative history or 
preamble, it may or may not be adequately taken into account by the 
taxpayer or the enforcing legislative body or court.  This can happen 
when the IRS is faced with a textualist judge who focuses on whether 
the taxpayer complied with the literal words of the statute and not 
whether they circumvented the underlying purpose of the law.150  On the 
other hand, if a judge or regulator does take the legislative history or 
preamble into account, the articulation of the principle in the rule itself 
may benefit unsophisticated taxpayers who may not be aware of the 
rule’s historical purpose.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed, “the 
plain meaning of the statute should be conclusive except in the ‘rare 
cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’”151  In order to 
protect against these events, where feasible, the underlying principle 
 
taxpayers’ ability to separate foreign income taxes from the underlying income on which such taxes 
are imposed.  71 Fed. Reg. 44,240 (Aug. 4, 2006) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).  According to 
Treasury and the IRS, this type of separation is “contrary to the general purpose of the foreign tax 
credit to relieve double taxation of foreign-source income.”  Id. pmbl.  Although this general 
principle is articulated in the Preamble, it is not contained in the underlying regulatory provision, 
which consists of a detailed set of rules relating to foreign consolidated groups and reverse hybrid 
entities.  Id. at 44,243-47. 
 149. Schauer, supra note 74, at 72. 
 150. Codification of the principle should “give the government an edge in any litigated matter” 
because “[c]ourts give much greater deference to a position clearly incorporated in regulations than 
the same position supported only by an interpretation of case law.”  Joseph Bankman, The New 
Market In Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775, 1788 (June 21, 1999).  See also Karen C. 
Burke, Black & Decker in the Fourth Circuit: Tax Shelters and Textualism, 111 TAX NOTES 315 
(Apr. 17, 2006) (in discussing the Fourth Circuit’s textualist approach in Black & Decker Corp. v. 
U.S., 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006), rev’g in part and aff’g in part, 340 F. Supp.2d 621 (D. Md. 
2004), in which they resolved the statutory issues in favor of the taxpayer, having concluded that the 
statutory language was unambiguous and did not need to examine the purpose of the statute in light 
of legislative history and relevant case law); Aprill, supra note 78, at 19 (“[C]odifying a standard 
would be expected, at the very least, to have some effect on the calculus employed by judges acting 
as presumptive positivism in deciding whether to resort to these common law doctrines.  It would 
make the standard more salient.”). 
 151. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
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should take the form of a direct statement of the principle in the statute 
or regulation either as the operative baseline provision, followed by any 
requisite prescriptive carve-outs, or as a catch-all provision.   
I believe that this tailored use of principles-based rules would 
provide the best of both regulatory approaches.  Taxpayers would have 
certainty and predictability with respect to non-abusive, ordinary course 
transactions.  At the same time, the government would be better 
equipped to deal with the emergence of new market technologies and to 
combat the inherent advantage that MNCs have in being able to exploit 
the cracks in the regulatory construct that will inevitably materialize.  In 
addition, highly detailed portions of the Code could be streamlined by 
implementing their principled counterparts.  Accordingly, I believe that 
a more balanced use of principles-based rules and prescriptive rules in 
the corporate tax laws could result in significant improvements to the 
overall system. 
3.  Case Study: The Foreign-Tax Credit Generator Regulations 
The utility of a more comprehensive use of principles-based rules is 
evidenced in the ongoing issues that have arisen with respect to the 
foreign tax credit regime, an area that is among the IRS’s top 
compliance concerns for large corporate taxpayers.152  U.S.-based MNCs 
have been engaging in highly structured cross-border transactions with 
foreign counterparties in order to generate foreign tax credits.  Of 
particular concern are transactions in which ordinary-course financing 
and portfolio investments, either of which would typically result in little 
or no foreign taxes, are elaborately engineered to create structures which 
purportedly generate foreign tax and permit the U.S. taxpayer to claim a 
credit for the foreign tax payments while also allowing the foreign 
counterparty to claim a foreign tax benefit.153  The U.S. taxpayers then 
 
 152. Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Announces Release of Guidance on Foreign Tax Credit 
Generator Transactions, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 62-13 (Mar. 29, 2007). 
153. The preamble to Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5) reads:  
[The transactions convert these ordinary transaction into] some form of 
equity ownership in a foreign special purpose vehicle (SPV).  The transaction 
is deliberately structured to create income in the SPV for foreign tax 
purposes, which income is purportedly subject to foreign tax. The parties 
exploit differences between U.S. and foreign law in order to permit the U.S. 
taxpayer to claim a credit for the purported foreign tax payments while also 
allowing the foreign counterparty to claim a foreign tax benefit. The U.S. 
taxpayer and the foreign counterparty share the cost of the purported foreign 
tax payments through the pricing of the arrangement.  
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use these foreign tax credits to shelter unrelated foreign source income.  
Enforcement efforts against these structures had been limited in part 
because, as acknowledged by the IRS and Treasury, there is often a 
business purpose for the financing or portfolio investment underlying the 
otherwise elaborately engineered transactions.154 
The IRS responded to these perceived abuses by issuing a series of 
proposed and temporary regulations over the last two years that would 
disallow foreign tax credits for these highly engineered structures.155  In 
fact, in a recent IRS industry director memorandum to field specialists, 
the director emphasized that foreign tax creditor generator transactions 
were given Tier I issue status because of the “significant drain on the 
U.S. Treasury that these transactions are causing.”156  The problem with 
the new foreign tax credit generator regulations, however, is that they 
further complicate the already absurdly detailed regulatory landscape by 
using narrowly constructed prescriptive rules in order to combat an 
MNC’s ability to engage in highly engineered transactions (which are 
structured to take advantage of other narrowly constructed prescriptive 
rules), without providing the backstop of an underlying principle or basis 
of credit disallowance. 
Section 901 generally allows a credit for foreign income taxes paid 
or deemed paid by qualifying taxpayers who elect the credit in lieu of 
deducting the taxes.  The credit is intended to alleviate the double 
taxation that results when income earned in a foreign country is taxed by 
both the United States and the country of source.  A payment to a 
foreign government is considered a creditable tax, however, only if it is 
“compulsory.”157  Treasury regulation Section 1.901-2(e)(5), which 
provides that an amount paid is not a “compulsory” payment, and thus is 
 
Preamble to Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5), 72 Fed. Reg. 15,081, 15,802 (Mar. 30, 2007).  See 
also Lisa Nada, Korb Discusses International Tax Developments, Praises IRS’s Success, 2006 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 220-3 (Nov. 15, 2006). 
 154. Preamble to Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5), 72 Fed. Reg. 15,081. 
 155. Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.901-2(e)(5), 72 Fed. Reg. 15,081; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5), 
73 Fed. Reg. 40,727 (July 16, 2008) (effective for foreign payments that, if they were an amount of 
tax paid, would be considered paid or accrued by a U.S. or foreign entity in taxable years ending on 
or after July 16, 2008).  Interestingly, Treasury tried to provide some guidance with respect to the 
foreign tax credit area in Notice 98-5.  See Notice 2004-19, 2004-1 C.B. 606 (withdrawing Notice 
98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334).  In particular, the notice contemplated regulations that would apply an 
economic profit test to disallow credits for foreign taxes generated in certain arrangements if the 
reasonably expected economic profit were determined to be insubstantial compared to the value of 
the foreign tax credits expected to be obtained as a result of the arrangement.  Id.  This project, 
however, was withdrawn in Notice 2004-19.  Id. 
 156. IRS Alerts LMSB Field Specialists to Abusive Foreign Tax Credit Generator 
Transactions, 2008 TAX NOTES TODAY 55-10 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
 157. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2) (2008). 
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not an amount of tax paid, to the extent that the amount paid exceeds the 
amount of liability under foreign law, is intended to “ensure that a 
taxpayer will make reasonable efforts to minimize its foreign tax liability 
even though the taxpayer otherwise may be indifferent to the imposition 
of the foreign tax due to the foreign tax credit.”158   
The regulations are intended to refine Treasury regulation Section 
1.901-2(e)(5) by enunciating a set of six factually descriptive criteria 
defining certain “structured passive investment arrangements” that the 
IRS and Treasury believe are abusive, and with respect to which the 
payments would be “noncompulsory” and therefore not eligible for the 
foreign tax credit.159  Although the regulations provide this laundry list 
of offensive attributes, it fails to identify what underlying principle is 
evidently not upheld. 
As noted by Kevin Dolan,160 the “government’s problem with the 
described transaction is left unstated,” and by resorting to prescriptive 
rules, the proposed regulation “obscures the problem it is intended to 
address.”161  All we can glean from the regulation itself is that the 
 
 158. Richard Lipton, Proposed Regulations on Foreign Tax Credits Use Mechanical Tests to 
Target Abuses, 107 J. TAX’N 4 (July 2007).  For purposes of determining whether an amount paid 
exceeds the amount of liability under foreign law for tax, Treasury regulation Section 1.901-2(e)(5) 
provides that:  
An amount paid does not exceed the amount of such liability if the amount 
paid is determined by the taxpayer in a manner that is consistent with a 
reasonable interpretation and application of the substantive and procedural 
provisions of foreign law (including applicable tax treaties) in such a way as 
to reduce, over time, the taxpayer's reasonably expected liability under 
foreign law for tax, and if the taxpayer exhausts all effective and practical 
remedies, including invocation of competent authority procedures available 
under applicable tax treaties, to reduce, over time, the taxpayer's liability for 
foreign tax (including liability pursuant to a foreign tax audit adjustment). 
Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2T(e)(5)(iv)(B). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Kevin Dolan, a senior vice president at Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., in 1978 was a docket 
attorney for the foreign tax credit regulations project that ultimately resulted in the regulations that 
would be amended by the proposed regulation.  Dolan, supra note 90, at 1155 (summary). 
 161. Id., stating: 
One can review the attributes and not find a single one that has previously 
been considered objectionable.  The government’s problem with the 
described transaction is left unstated.   For there to be a problem, the foreign 
tax credits arising from the transaction must be considered not to be paid.   If 
at some point the regulation were challenged, how would the government 
answer a judge’s question:  If a transaction has the six attributes, the reason a 
foreign income tax has not been paid is because . . . because what? . . .  [T]he 
proposed regulation itself does not state a principle or rule but instead 
identifies a transaction that it wishes to proscribe without stating why that 
transaction is bad. . . . It does not govern by principle but by a set of 
prescriptive rules. 
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government does not like excess foreign tax credits that result from 
structured transactions.  The obvious problem with this is that “there is 
no tax policy and certainly no authority that would suggest that a 
transaction that results in excess foreign tax credits is problematic per 
se.”162  The regulation itself does not even disallow excess foreign tax 
credits per se, because it requires that six enumerated criteria be 
satisfied.163 
According to the standard I articulated above, this type of situation 
is ideal for implementing a principles-based rule.  The taxpayer is able to 
change the form of its transaction while maintaining the underlying 
economics, in order to achieve significant tax benefits.  In addition, in 
light of the highly engineered structures involved, it is evident that the 
evolution of subsequent iterations that escape the provisions will be 
impossible to control.  Indeed, because, as promulgated, the regulations 
will only apply if this series of six requirements are met, it is no surprise 
that there are already in fact transactions being implemented that are 
substantially identical to the targeted structures, but manage to avoid the 
regulations.164  There are likewise transactions that have no tax 
avoidance purpose, but nevertheless are arguably subject to the 
regulations because they happen to meet the six prescriptive criteria.165 
Accordingly, a much more effective result would be to promulgate 
a rule specifically articulating the underlying principle at the heart of the 
government’s concern.  For example, the IRS may want to implement a 
more general rule limiting the ability of U.S. taxpayers to claim credits 
for foreign tax payments relating to passive investments when the 
foreign counterparty is also allowed to claim a foreign tax benefit with 
respect to the same arrangement.166  Not only would this force the IRS to 
 
Id.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2T(e)(5)(iv). 
 164. Diana Wollman has observed that the proposed regulations surprisingly would not prevent 
foreign tax credit claims in four recent internal legal memoranda that deal with situations similar 
(and in one case, nearly identical) to those addressed by the proposed regulations.  Ships Passing in 
the Night?  The Proposed Foreign Tax Credit Regulations Seem to Sail Right By The Foreign Tax 
Credit Arbitrage that the IRS Has Challenged in Audits - Was That Intentional?, 2007 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 171-8 (Aug. 31, 2007).  See also Lipton, supra note 158.     
 165. See, e.g., Overbroad FTC Antiarbitrage Regulations Enter Into Force, 120 TAX NOTES 
495 (Aug. 4, 2008) (“We are concerned, however, that the regulators may be overinclusive, because 
the identifying features as drafted in the regulations may be found in joint ventures and other 
business arrangements not involving tax arbitrage.”). 
 166. For these purposes, I will assume that the requisite regulatory authority exists for the IRS 
to promulgate such a rule.  However, there is considerable dispute on this matter.  Treasury, after 
failing to get explicit legislative authority from Congress allowing it to attack transactions that are 
intentionally structured to generate foreign taxes in a manner that allows the parties to obtain 
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be more explicit as to the behavior it finds objectionable, but it would 
also help prevent further violations of the currently unstated principle.   
As evidenced by these new foreign tax credit generator regulations, 
U.S. tax policymakers are increasingly enacting transaction-specific 
prescriptive rules that serve to draw subtle distinctions as to what is 
allowed and what is disallowed.167  In fact, “most of the amendments to 
the international rules over the last two decades have been stop-gap 
responses to perceived abuses without significant consideration of 
underlying policies.”168  The resulting U.S. corporate tax system is a 
complex and ever-growing labyrinth of gap-filling prescriptive rules that 
are enacted as tax lawmakers try to react to these engineered tax-
advantageous structures.  Rather than continuing down this road of 
accretive complexity, a commitment to implementing more principles-
based rules would yield a simpler and more effective corporate tax 
regime.   
4.  Principles-Based Rules and Corporate Tax Rates 
For the reasons already discussed, I believe that having an 
increased focus on implementing principles-based rules in the U.S. 
corporate tax system will yield any number of other concrete 
improvements to both MNC taxpayers and the government.  As an 
additional benefit, I believe that the implementation of principles-based 
rules could allow the United States to lower its high statutory corporate 
rates.169 
Because principles should help close loopholes and provide a more 
effective constraint against highly engineered transactions, they would 
have the effect of reducing the number of opportunities for MNCs to 
engage in self-help measures to minimize their effective tax rate.  Our 
relatively high corporate tax rates produce enormous incentives for 
MNCs to proactively pursue aggressive strategies to reduce their tax 
burden.  Indeed, “[t]he tax savings that may be realized under the current 
 
duplicate benefits, stated in the Preamble to the proposed regulations that additional legislative 
authority is not needed to address foreign tax credit abuses.  71 Fed. Reg. 44,240 (Aug. 4, 2006) (to 
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).  But see Dolan, supra note 90, (stating that because the proposed 
regulation does not appear to enforce any existing or stated statutory purpose, it is invalid).  
Compare the U.K. government’s anti-cross-border arbitrage legislation, which targets the use of 
hybrid entities and instruments in double-dip structures, discussed supra note 122.   
 167. See, e.g., Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax 
Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319 (1994). 
 168. ABA INT’L TAX REFORM REPORT, supra note 6, at 659. 
 169. See discussion, supra, Part II.B. 
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rules justify the additional investment of resources to evaluate elective 
alternatives and engage in tax planning.”170  Accordingly, so long as the 
fault lines created by our current prescriptive rules create loopholes that 
can be exploited by taxpayers, the intricate tax system that is created 
may have what Steven Dean refers to as “attractive complexity.”171  That 
is, a rational taxpayer will always prefer “a complex tax rule when its 
economic costs (e.g. $100 in time and legal fees) are more than offset by 
tax benefits the rule facilitates (e.g. $101 in tax savings).”172 
No matter how “attractive” complexity may be to certain MNCs 
now, a more principles-focused corporate tax regime could be just as 
economically desirable to MNCs if their implementation is combined 
with a lowering of the overall statutory rate.  Even though opportunities 
to engineer a lower effective rate would be lost, not only could those 
costs be offset by a lower statutory rate, but significant savings could 
also be realized through lower compliance costs.  It is estimated that 
billions of dollars are spent each year by taxpayers in compliance costs, 
and these costs are relatively larger for taxpayers that are subject to the 
United States’ corporate tax provisions.173  Not surprisingly, MNCs 
become frustrated with (and less profitable by) trying to untangle the 
intricate web that our U.S. tax system has created, and a simpler Code 
could help mitigate these costs.   
From the tax lawmakers’ perspective, any base-broadening tactics, 
such as the proposed movement towards more principles-based 
regulations, should be welcome as they try to push through a lower 
corporate tax rate through Congress, because it would allow the measure 
to be implemented in a revenue-neutral way.  The United States’ current 
position of having the second-highest corporate tax rate among the 
OECD countries is becoming politically untenable.  Not surprisingly, the 
President and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have reiterated their 
desire for the United States to drop its statutory corporate rates to be 
more in line with those of other industrialized countries.174   
 
 170. See ABA INT’L TAX REFORM REPORT, supra note 6, at 717. 
 171. See Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box 
Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 409 (2005) (distinguishing 
attractive complexity from burdensome complexity). 
 172. Unfortunately, even though the rule’s complexity may be attractive to taxpayers, it still 
consumes $100 of society’s resources.  Id. at 417.  
 173. See Logue, supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 174. In President Barack Obama’s remarks during the Fiscal Responsibility Summit in 
February 2009, he reiterated his commitment to making significant changes to our corporate tax 
system, including the lowering of corporate tax rates.  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the 
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The inherent benefits of a principles-based approach would become 
significantly more evident to MNCs (who may otherwise resist the 
shutting down of corporate loopholes) if they were implemented in a 
revenue-neutral way.  As between the current U.S. corporate tax system 
and an economically equivalent principles-based alternative, it must be 
the case that it would be preferable to choose a system that is simpler, 
more effective, promotes fairness and least encourages distorted 
behavior and the arbitrary shifting of economic activity.  In fact, a 
revenue-neutral implementation of principles-based rules that results in 
simplification not only should be more competitive, but could also result 
in a net positive societal benefit.  While the tax on MNCs and U.S. 
revenue collection would remain constant, the extraordinarily high costs 
of taxpayer compliance and Treasury enforcement costs could be greatly 
reduced.  With respect to the MNCs, any resulting higher profits could 
lead to lower costs of goods and services for U.S. residents and 
increased investment of residual capital in the United States.  Similarly, 
decreased administrative costs for the government could result in more 
available funds for domestic programs.  Accordingly, an optimal use of 
the proposed systematic implementation of principles-based rules may 
be as part of a broader, revenue-neutral, tax reform effort that involves 
the lowering of the statutory corporate rate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The consequences of globalization, such as the proliferation of 
cross-border activity, multi-jurisdictional organizational structures and 
increases in tax arbitrage transactions, continue to challenge U.S. tax 
administrators.  Furthermore, the pressure to resolve these challenges 
while protecting the U.S. tax base is particularly difficult given the level 
of sophistication and elasticity of the MNCs that they are trying to 
regulate.  Nevertheless, the development of a simple and efficient 
corporate tax system that will not unduly burden U.S.-based MNCs is a 
worthwhile tax policy objective.  The overwhelming complexity of the 
U.S. corporate tax regime and its high statutory corporate rates are two 
significant challenges that should be addressed in any significant 
corporate tax reform effort.  Highly sophisticated MNCs often find ways 
to use the complexities of the U.S. tax system to create intricate 
transactional structures that serve to reduce their U.S. tax liability (and 
 
President and the Vice President at the Opening of the Fiscal Responsibility Summit (Feb. 23, 2009) 
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/). 
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help overcome the otherwise high statutory rate), but produce significant 
social waste in the process.   
I believe that a transition towards a regulatory system that is more 
structured around principles-based rules will lead to simplification of our 
corporate tax rules, make the system more adaptable to changes in the 
market, and increase efficiency by reducing the social cost of highly 
engineered transactions.  Furthermore, because the introduction of more 
principles-based rules would limit the opportunities available for 
taxpayers to engage in beneficial tax planning by narrowing tax planning 
loopholes, the implementation of more principles-based rules could 
serve an important role in reducing our high statutory corporate rates in a 
revenue-neutral way. 
While a reliance on prescriptive rules to govern straightforward, 
commonplace transactions may continue, in other areas, principles-based 
rules should significantly supplement, and in many instances supplant, 
these prescriptive rules in order to both simplify the tax law and serve as 
a backstop to the prescriptive rules to prevent the emergence of 
loopholes.  In particular, the use of principles would be most efficacious 
when one or both of the following characteristics are present: (i) the line 
drawn by the prescriptive rule relates to a change in form only, and not 
in behavior or economic consequences of the taxpayer, and the 
distinctions made by the rule create significant differences in the 
potential tax liability of the taxpayer; and (ii) subtle changes to, or 
evolutions of, the form of the targeted transaction can easily avoid 
application of the law. 
In the end, one of the ironic problems of being a country with a rich 
legal history is that we are often so wedded to our current system that 
despite its numerous admitted flaws, we are reluctant to embrace change.  
Our current prescriptive corporate tax provisions reward aggressive tax 
planning and can create incentives to encourage the movement of capital 
out of our tax system, and otherwise distort the behavior of MNCs.  
MNCs are able to be opportunistic in many of their decisions regarding 
their utilization of particular markets, with respect to location, structure 
and form, and are thus more easily able to maximize their after-tax 
returns and minimize their regulatory burdens.  As such, globalization is 
steadily reducing the margin of error that the United States has 
historically enjoyed, and U.S. lawmakers should evaluate the elements 
of our system that we know are failing, yet have the power to change, 
before we fall further behind.  
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